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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mental disorder among criminal defendants affects every stage of the 
criminal justice process, from investigational issues to competence to be 
executed.1  As in all other areas of mental health law, at least some people 
with mental disorders, especially severe disorders, are treated specially by 
the criminal law.  The underlying thesis of this Article is that people with 
mental disorder should, as far as is practicable and consistent with justice, 
be treated just like everyone else.  In some areas, the law is relatively 
sensible and just.  In others, too often the opposite is true and the laws 
sweep too broadly.  I believe, however, that special rules to deal with at 
least some people with mental disorder2 are justified because they 
substantially lack rational capacity, a condition that justifies disparate 
treatment.  Treating people with mental disorder specially is a two-edged 
sword.  Failing to do so when it is appropriate is unjust, but the opposite is 
demeaning, stigmatizing, and paternalistic. The central normative question 
is when special treatment is justified, a question the next Part addresses. 
 
1 When I wish to refer to all the doctrines generically, I will summarily term them 
“criminal competence and responsibility.” 
2 I use the term “people with mental disorder” advisedly.  Although it is more 
cumbersome than the term “the mentally disordered,” it is the preferred, more respectful way 
of referring to such people because it avoids treating them as equivalent to their disorder.  
For a more specific example, it is preferable to refer to a “person with schizophrenia” rather 
than a “schizophrenic.”  I recognize that it is common to refer to people with physical 
disease in the essentializing form, such as a “diabetic” rather than a “person with diabetes.”  
Nevertheless, because as the next Part describes, mental disorder is diagnosed behaviorally 
rather than mechanistically, the essentializing locution carries the risk of undermining 
respect for the sufferer’s personhood and of stigmatizing the person unduly.  Despite these 
considerations, I will also refer to the behavior that justifies the label of mental disorder as 
“crazy behavior.”  This locution betokens no disrespect towards sufferers.  For legal 
purposes, it is simply the most descriptive and neutral and least question-begging term that 
can be used.  See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of 
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 547–54 (1978). 
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This Article will focus mainly on United States Supreme Court cases 
to review the current state of the law, with special attention to the many 
criminal mental health law contexts in which preventive detention is an 
issue.  It makes no pretense to covering every issue, to providing a complete 
analysis of these cases, or to comprehensive coverage of all the arguments 
concerning the issues raised.  The Court’s cases are simply a vehicle for 
organizing the overview. To celebrate the one-hundredth anniversary of the 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, I will survey the landscape from 
the vantage of four decades of working in this field as a scholar, legislative 
drafter, advocate, and practitioner in both law and mental health.  The goal 
is to explore what I consider the most just approach in each area.  In some 
cases, my preferences are foreclosed by constitutional constraints; in others, 
the preferred approach could be achieved by statute or by state supreme 
court decisions. 
Part II provides an analysis of the concept of mental disorder, both in 
the fields of mental health, primarily psychiatry and psychology, and in 
law.  I consider why the law treats some people with severe mental disorder 
specially and I address confusions and distractions about this issue.  Then I 
turn to the legal survey, beginning in Part III with pretrial issues, including 
competence to waive constitutional rights during pretrial investigation, the 
right to a court-appointed mental health expert, competence to stand trial, 
commitment to restore trial competence, the right of the state to 
involuntarily medicate an incompetent defendant to restore competence, 
and competence to plead guilty.  Part IV considers trial-related procedural 
issues, including the right to represent oneself, and culpability issues, 
including negation of mens rea (so-called diminished capacity), partial 
responsibility mitigations, such as the Model Penal Code’s “extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance” doctrine, the defense of legal insanity, the “guilty 
but mentally ill” verdict, and the potential for adopting a generic mitigating 
doctrine of partial responsibility. 
Part V next addresses post-trial issues, including competence to be 
sentenced, the role of mental disorder in setting sentences, including the 
imposition of capital punishment, involuntary medication of prisoners, 
transfer of prisoners to mental hospitals, competence to be executed, and 
the right of the state to involuntarily medicate an incompetent prisoner to 
restore competence to be executed.  Part VI considers two forms of 
involuntary civil commitment that are used primarily for preventive 
detention, commitment of so-called mentally abnormal sexually violent 
predators and commitment after a defendant is found not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  The last substantive section, Part VII, briefly considers the 
challenge to criminal law from the new neuroscience, a challenge that 
threatens the very foundation of criminal responsibility for all defendants 
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and not just for those who suffer from severe mental disorder.  A brief 
conclusion follows. 
II. WHAT IS MENTAL DISORDER AND WHY DOES IT AUTHORIZE SPECIAL 
LEGAL TREATMENT? 
This Part begins with the mental health profession’s definition of 
mental disorder.  It then turns to the legal definition and explains why it 
authorizes special legal treatment.  The differing definitions reflect the 
different goals of the criminal law and mental health systems.  The former 
is primarily concerned with justice and social safety; the latter is primarily 
concerned with the prevention and treatment of mental disorders.  The Part 
concludes by explaining prevalent confusions and distractions about why 
people with mental disorder are treated differently. 
A. MENTAL HEALTH DEFINITIONS 
Let us begin with the American Psychiatric Association’s generic 
definition of mental disorder: 
[E]ach of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral 
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is 
associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., 
impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with significantly 
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.  In 
addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally 
sanctioned response to a particular event . . . .  Whatever its original cause, it must be 
considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological or biological dysfunction in 
the individual.  Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor 
conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders 
unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual, as 
described above.3 
With respect, this definition is so broad, vague, and subjective that it is 
of little help in determining who should be treated specially by the law and 
why.  To its credit, the American Psychiatric Association’s authors 
recognize these problems.  They attempt to remedy it with various caveats, 
 
3 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS, 4TH EDITION-TEXT REVISION xxxi (2000) [hereinafter, DSM-IV-TR or simply 
DSM].  DSM-V is currently in development and will probably be published in 2013.  The 
generic definition is not likely to be substantially changed, however.  For the most current 
working definition proposed by the DSM-V working group charged with developing the 
generic definition, see Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (May 18, 2010), 
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=465 (providing 
essentially the same criteria listed separately as “features”).  The major difference is that the 
proposed revision also provides a set of “other considerations,” but no guidance is given 
about how they are to be used. 
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but the difficulty remains.  Consequently, to obtain clearer understanding of 
the nature of the phenomenon under consideration, it is useful to turn to an 
examination of the specific diagnostic categories encompassed in the 
manual.  Before doing so, however, we should note two cautions that the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) raises.  First, 
there is enormous heterogeneity within each disorder category.4  That is, 
people who technically meet the criteria for the diagnosis may have quite 
different presentations.  This is not surprising because it is also true of 
physical diseases.  All sufferers from the same type of cancer, for example, 
do not present precisely alike.  Second, these diagnostic criteria were 
developed for clinical and research purposes; they were not developed to 
answer legal questions and indeed do not do so.5 
If one examines the “elements” of mental disorders, the criteria that 
must be established to make a diagnosis, mental disorder is diagnosed 
entirely on the basis of behavioral indicia, broadly defined to include 
perceptions, thoughts, desires, feelings, moods, and actions.6  Despite the 
astonishing recent advances in the brain sciences and the drumbeat of 
claims that mental disorder is a brain disease, we still have very little 
understanding of the causation of mental disorder and few measures of it 
that do not require substantial amounts of subjective judgment by either the 
subject providing a self-report or the external diagnostician.  There are no 
physical tests, including brain scans, that can accurately diagnose mental 
disorders.7  The undoubted success of some biological interventions to 
ameliorate the behavioral signs and symptoms of mental disorder does not 
undermine this conclusion.  The ability to successfully treat a disorder at 
some level of intervention, such as the biological, the psychological, or the 
sociological, does not mean that the problem was caused at that level.  For 
example, alleviating with ethanol (alcohol) the sad feelings occasioned by 
an adverse life event does not mean that the sad feelings were primarily 
 
4 Id. at xxxi. 
5 Id. at xxxii–xxxiii, xxxvii. 
6 Even delirium, dementia, and similar disorders, which were previously classified as 
“organic disorders,” are diagnosed behaviorally.  An organic abnormality must only be 
assumed and need not be identified.  Id. at 135. 
7 Allen Frances, Whither DSM-V?, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 391, 391 (2009).  Many 
studies do find differences between patients with mental disorders and controls, but the 
differences are too small to be used diagnostically.  But see generally John P. A. Ioannidis, 
Excess Significance Bias in the Literature on Brain Volume Abnormalities,  
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY (Apr. 4, 2011), http://archpsyc.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/ 
archgenpsychiatry.2011.28v1.pdf (claiming, based on a meta-analysis of studies of brain 
volume abnormalities in patients with mental disorders, that many more studies than should 
be expected found statistically significant results and that this can be best explained by bias 
in the reporting of the data). 
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produced by “ethanol deficiency disorder.”  To believe otherwise is to be 
guilty of the “treatment aetiology fallacy.”8  The most compelling 
assumption about the causation of complex human behavior, including 
severe mental disorders, is that it will require a multifield, multilevel 
approach to explanation that avoids biological reductionism or any other 
form of univariate explanation.9 
If mental disorder is best understood today as a behavioral disorder—a 
behavioral abnormality—the question is what kind of behavior qualifies for 
consideration as a disorder or illness.  After all, many kinds of statistically 
abnormal behaviors or behavioral capacities, such as enormously high 
intelligence or the ability to play the piano at the concert level, would not 
qualify as disorders.  Further, various types of behaviors that can potentially 
make people unhappy, such as having terrible manners or an unpleasant 
personality, are not per se disorders.  Finally, for another example, many 
varieties of severe unhappiness, such as mourning the death of a loved one 
or the loss of a job, are not abnormal nor the sign of a disorder.  The 
difficulty of specifying the criteria for behavioral abnormality that qualify it 
as a disorder is further complicated by understanding that actions that are 
the signs and symptoms of behavioral disorders are not pure mechanisms.10  
They are part of the entire psychological experience and life history of a 
whole human being, who inevitably is a maker and interpreter of meaning, 
and who is embedded in a social context and in interpersonal relationships 
that strongly affect his behavioral experience.  This will be true even in 
those cases of the most severe and intractable abnormalities of cognition 
and mood in which a purely mechanistic explanation seems most 
compelling.11  Finally, defining mental disorder is further complicated by 
 
8 MICHAEL W. EYSENCK, PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 856 (2004). 
9 See generally CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC 
UNITY OF NEUROSCIENCE (2007) (arguing for a multifield, multilevel explanatory scheme 
within neuroscience and more generally). 
10 Mechanisms are actions and mental states that cannot be in part explained or 
rationalized by the agent’s reasons for action.  For example, addiction to a substance is 
centrally defined by the signs of persistent seeking and using the substance.  See Stephen J. 
Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 
176 (2006).  Even if seeking and using are signs of a disease that has genetic, anatomical, 
and physiological causes, they are nonetheless actions.  Indeed, all intentional action has 
genetic, anatomical, and physiological causes, whether or not the action is the sign of a 
disease.  The addict has an exceptionally powerful desire—a craving—to consume the 
addictive substance, believes that consuming it will satisfy that craving by avoiding pain, 
causing pleasure, or some combination of the two, and therefore forms and acts on the 
intention to seek and to use the substance.  Such explanatory practical syllogisms are the 
mark of all intentional actions. 
11 See generally RICHARD J. MCNALLY, WHAT IS MENTAL ILLNESS? (2011) (providing a 
nuanced, scholarly analysis of the nature of mental disorder, including the role of culture in 
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the social values that attach to behavior that do not attach to pure 
mechanisms.  No one properly judges a mechanism in interpersonal terms, 
but behavior is judged socially as justified or not, and as appropriate or not. 
I suggest again, as I have for over three decades, that mental disorder 
is best understood for legal purposes as crazy behavior, that is, behavior 
that makes no sense and that is associated with dysfunction or suffering.12  
In less colloquial language, it is irrational behavior that is refractory to 
evidence and argument.  Behavior that is crazier or more irrational indicates 
more severe disorder; less crazy or less irrational behavior indicates milder 
disorder.  No one denies that crazy behavior exists.  I recognize that the 
definition may be both over- and under-inclusive.  For example, it facially 
fails to distinguish some normal but deep religious beliefs, or some cases 
that plausibly involve disorder but in which suffering or dysfunction is 
absent.13  Nonetheless, the definition of mental disorder as crazy behavior 
comes closer to an adequate description of the phenomenon in question than 
any other and it runs the least risk of triggering reductionist assumptions 
about the causation of the behavior or demeaning assumptions about the 
non-responsibility of those who exhibit such behavior.  Such assumptions 
tend to deny agency, respect, and dignity to people as persons.  Moreover, 
as philosophers of medicine understand and as DSM recognizes, there is no 
consensual generic definition of or criteria for disease or disorder.14  
Abnormality is an essentially normative notion. 
I am not denying the usefulness of thinking of mental disorders, 
especially the most severe disorders, as medical diseases.  Although the 
medical model continues to have critics, especially when it is most 
expansionistic and imperialistic,15 there is clearly something “wrong” with 
 
explaining the causes, the signs and symptoms, and the experience of mental disorder by 
sufferers).  Professor McNally rightly rejects a thoroughly social constructionist view of 
most mental disorders.  He believes that some conditions, such as mania, melancholia, panic 
disorder and others, are natural kinds, for which culture penetrates only the presentation of 
the disorder, such as the content of delusions.  See id. at 128–158, especially 129–34, 156–
58.  Although I agree in principle about the universality and resistance to cultural influence 
of some disorders, the way a disorder presents, including its content, affects the experience 
and behavior of the sufferer. I doubt that Professor McNally would disagree, but there may 
be a difference in emphasis concerning the degree of influence. 
12 See Morse, supra note 2, at 553. 
13 For example, people with Asperger’s Disorder, a developmental disorder marked by 
impairment in social interaction and restricted behavioral range, especially if it is mild, may 
find or create environments in which the disorder does not cause significant distress or 
dysfunction.  DSM, supra note 3, at 80–84.  As DSM notes, many people with this disorder 
find gainful employment and self-sufficiency as adults.  Id. at 82. 
14 Id. at xxx. 
15 E.g., ALLAN V. HORWITZ & JEROME C. WAKEFIELD, THE LOSS OF SADNESS: HOW 
PSYCHIATRY TRANSFORMED NORMAL SORROW INTO DEPRESSIVE DISORDER (2007); HERB 
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people with severe disorders that properly lends itself to thinking that they 
are “sick,” rather than odd, bad, or other potential characterizations of crazy 
behavior.  Nonetheless, for legal purposes, crazy behavior continues to be 
the best generic descriptor of the phenomenon. 
B. CRIMINAL LAW AND MENTAL DISORDER 
The ability of the state to respond to dangerous people can best be 
explained by what I call “desert-disease jurisprudence.”16  The state can 
justifiably convict and punish a citizen in the criminal justice system if the 
agent has committed a crime, was responsible at the time of the crime, and 
therefore deserves punishment.  Moreover, the state can do this only if the 
defendant is competent at each stage of the process.  The state can civilly 
commit a dangerous but non-responsible agent if the citizen is sufficiently 
predictively dangerous, or if the criminal justice process cannot proceed 
until the defendant is restored to the necessary competence.  This 
distinction maximally protects liberty and autonomy by leaving people free 
to pursue their projects and to bear the consequences unless they 
responsibly offend or unless lack of responsibility for their potential, 
dangerous conduct has already deprived them of the autonomy and liberty 
we otherwise seek to protect.  It also allegedly protects the dignity of the 
individual and the integrity and justice of the criminal process by not 
treating incompetent people as competent.  Criminal mental health laws, 
which do treat some people specially, are thus exemplars of disease 
jurisprudence.  Although desert-disease jurisprudence is a good positive 
account of the relationship between our criminal justice and mental health 
systems, the law has adopted many doctrines to fill the “gap” between 
desert and disease that dangerous but responsible agents create.17 
To determine what the legal criteria for mental disorder should be, the 
underlying issue is why we treat some people with severe mental disorder 
as not responsible and autonomous, at least in the context in question.  I 
suggest that lack of the capacity for rationality is the primary reason the law 
treats some crazy people specially.  Only if the person has sufficient 
capacity for rationality does the law leave him or her free to pursue his or 
her own projects unencumbered by state intervention, to bear the 
consequences of his or her actions, and to be treated in the process as all 
 
KUTCHINS & STUART A. KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE 
CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1997). 
16 Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265 (1999).  The 
formulation that follows in the text expands on my earlier formulation to encompass 
competence as well as responsibility issues. 
17 Subpart VI.A, infra, discusses a major exemplar of such “gap-filling,” the allegedly 
civil, involuntary commitment of mentally abnormal sexually violent predators. 
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other responsible, autonomous agents are treated.  This accords the person 
the greatest degree of dignity and respect. 
Lack of capacity for control is also sometimes an independent criterion 
of non-responsibility.  Some criminal mental health law tests adopt such a 
standard, either alone18 or in addition to a rational capacity test.19  Lack of 
control is not well understood conceptually or scientifically in any of the 
relevant disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, and psychiatry, 
however, and we lack operationalized tests to accurately identify this type 
of lack of capacity.20  I have long been a critic of such standards for just 
these reasons.  The American Bar Association and the American Psychiatric 
Association also urged the rejection of control tests for legal insanity on 
these grounds.21  I suggest that for all cases in which a control test may 
seem required, the reason can be better characterized as a rationality defect 
because control difficulties flow from lack of access to the good reasons not 
to act in the wrong way.22  Moreover, ordinary people and experts alike 
have a better understanding of and can more accurately identify rationality 
defects.23  Whether control incapacities exist independently and whether 
 
18 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (holding that proof that a defendant has a 
“serious difficulty in controlling [his] behavior” is a constitutionally required independent 
criterion for the involuntary civil commitment of a mentally abnormal sexually violent 
predator); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). 
19 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease 
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”). 
20 Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 
1060–62 (2002). 
21 AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMMITTEE, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1 cmt. (1984); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, American 
Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, reprinted in 140 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983). 
22 One of the first criminal law theoreticians to argue for the necessity of an independent 
control test was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the great English criminal law historian, 
theorist, judge, and public intellectual.  See 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 170 (1883).  Fitzjames’s rationale was that self-control 
difficulties flow from the inability of the agent to keep long term consequences in mind and 
to guide one’s conduct by them.  Note, however, that this is a classic rationality problem. 
23 H.L.A. Hart recognized this over a half-century ago.  H.L.A. Hart, Legal 
Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 
95, 99 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958), reprinted in, H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28 (1st ed. 1968) [hereinafter HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY]. 
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they can be validly measured are open questions, however, which better 
conceptualization and science might help to resolve in the future.24 
How much capacity for rationality is required can be context-specific 
and can be otherwise variable, depending on the values of the society in 
question.  For example, the capacity for rationality required to consent to 
minimal medical treatment might be quite less than the capacity required to 
consent to a complex experimental intervention.  Similarly, the criteria for 
legal insanity can be restrictive or expansive depending on how tough or 
tender a jurisdiction might be.  If the person lacks substantial rational 
capacity in the context in question, however, then special legal rules might 
apply because we cannot credit the person’s reasons and actions or ask him 
to bear full responsibility for them. 
The criminal law can, but need not, turn to scientific or clinical 
definitions of mental abnormality as legal criteria when promulgating 
mental health laws.  The Supreme Court has reiterated on numerous 
occasions that there is substantial dispute within the mental health 
professions about diagnoses, that psychiatry is not an exact science, and that 
the law is not bound by extra-legal professional criteria.25  The law often 
uses technical terms, such as “mental disorder,” or semi-technical qualifiers, 
such as “severe,”26 but non-technical terms, such as “mental abnormality,” 
have also been approved.27  Legal criteria are adopted to answer legal 
questions.  As long as they plausibly do so, they will be approved even if 
they are not psychiatric or psychological criteria. 
The definition of mental disorder as crazy behavior fits well with the 
legal purpose of distinguishing some people with mental disorder.  It 
compels the law to recognize that the legal issue is behavioral—is the 
person capable of meeting the law’s rationality standard in the context in 
question?—and it makes clear that actions speak louder than clinical tests.  
When there is a disjunction between the person’s behavior in the world and 
the performance or outcome on any type of test, we must virtually always 
believe the behavior.28  That is the gold standard.  If the behavior is not 
clear, then tests may help resolve ambiguity, but, alas, the tests tend to be 
most unhelpful when the behavior is least clear.29  And again, thinking of 
 
24 I shall only write about rationality problems in what follows, but for those who believe 
that a control criterion is justified, the same set of considerations apply. 
25 E.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735,774–75 (2006); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 360 n.3 (1997); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
26 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006). 
27 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360. 
28 Cases of suspected malingering are an exception. 
29 I term this the “clear cut” problem.  See Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?: An 
Essay on Neuroscience and Law, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 529, 540 (Michael Freeman 
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mental abnormality as a behavioral difficulty, untethered from the medical 
model, avoids question-begging about mechanism and non-responsibility 
and potentially demeaning an autonomous agent. 
Mental disorder per se is not a sufficient criterion for special legal 
treatment.  All mental health laws require further legally relevant behavior, 
which is in fact the law’s primary concern.  For example, a criminal 
defendant will not be incompetent to stand trial solely because he or she 
suffers from a mental disorder.  The defendant must additionally not 
understand the charges against him or not be able to assist counsel.   A 
defendant raising the insanity defense must also not know the nature and 
quality of his act or the difference between right and wrong.  Defendants 
who cannot satisfy these further criteria are not competent or responsible 
because they are not rational.  Indeed, the various criminal competencies, 
such as competence to stand trial, to plead guilty, to proceed pro se, to be 
sentenced, and to be executed, are all essentially functional rationality 
standards.  As the standards for the legally relevant behaviors entail, they 
all test whether the agent has sufficient rational understanding and skills to 
satisfy the demands of due process in the context in question.30 
One could jettison the mental disorder criterion in mental health laws, 
the presence of a mental abnormality, and simply address the other legally 
relevant behavior entirely functionally, but the presence of a mental 
 
ed., 2011).  Scientists do not go on “fishing expeditions” for data.  Virtually all studies of 
potential interest to the law involve some behavior that has already been identified as of 
interest and the point of the study is to identify that behavior’s causes or correlates.  There is 
usually some bit of behavior, such as addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity that they 
would like to understand better.  To do this properly presupposes that they have identified 
and validated the behavior under investigation.  On occasion, the science might suggest that 
the behavior is not well-characterized or is biologically or causally indistinguishable from 
other, seemingly different behavior.  In general, however, the existence of legally relevant 
behavior will already be apparent.  For example, some people are grossly out of touch with 
reality.  If, as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them because 
they lack such knowledge.  We might learn a great deal about the causes or correlates of 
such abnormalities, but we already knew without any scientific data that these abnormalities 
existed and we had a firm view of their normative significance.  In such cases, the scientific 
data might be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified behaviors precisely because the 
behavior is so clear.  Less clear behavior is simply not studied or the overlap between less 
clear behavior and the behavioral controls is greater.  Thus, the markers of clear cases will 
provide little guidance to resolve behaviorally ambiguous cases of legally relevant behavior.  
For example, suppose in an insanity defense case the question is whether the defendant 
suffers from a major mental disorder such as schizophrenia.  In extreme cases, the behavior 
will be clear and no scientific data will be necessary, except perhaps for convergent validity.  
In the future, we may be able to use various tests to resolve ambiguous cases more 
successfully, but for now we cannot. 
30 See generally Morse, supra note 2, at 530–42 (explaining the function and structure of 
all mental health laws).  These laws are discussed in detail in the various subparts infra. 
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disorder allegedly provides an objective marker that the person genuinely 
lacks the required rational capacity.31  The mental disorder criterion for 
mental health laws achieves this goal only imperfectly at best, but its 
presence in these laws confirms that the fundamental legal goal is to 
respond properly to rational incapacity.  Finally, it is crucial to understand 
that the relation of mental disorder to the further legal criteria is not the 
relation of mechanical causation.  The issue is whether an offender’s 
practical reasoning was irrational in the context in issue. 
C. DISTRACTIONS AND CONFUSIONS ABOUT WHY MENTAL DISORDER 
AUTHORIZES SPECIAL TREATMENT 
Let us consider four underlying and related issues that are often 
thought to be relevant to criminal responsibility and competence but that are 
irrelevant confusions and distractions: free will, causation as an excuse, 
causation as compulsion, and prediction as an excuse.  Much bad thinking 
and practice about mental disorder and criminal law results from falling 
prey to these problems.32 
Contrary to what many people believe and what judges and others 
sometimes say, free will is not a legal criterion that is part of any doctrine 
and it is not even foundational for criminal competence or responsibility.33  
Criminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth of determinism or 
universal causation that allegedly undermines the foundations of 
responsibility.34  Even if determinism is true, some people do understand 
 
31 See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J., 
concurring) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 10 1960)). 
32 I discuss these issues in virtually everything I write about criminal responsibility and 
competence.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic 
Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 203, 209 (2007).  My critics accuse me of 
repeating myself.  I plead guilty and will continue to recidivate until people stop making 
these errors. 
33 Id. at 209.  By free will, I am referring to metaphysical libertarianism, the view that 
people can act uncaused by anything other than themselves.  This is sometimes referred to as 
“contra-causal freedom,” “agent origination,” or like terms.  This meaning is the strongest 
sense of free will and is a god-like power.  See infra note 35 and accompanying text.  When 
a criminal statute includes a term such as acting “freely” or against the “will,” which might 
be thought to refer to the strong sense of free will,  it refers to an ordinary excusing condition 
such as compulsion.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE,§ 261.2 (2010) (defining rape as sexual 
intercourse “against a person’s will”) & § 261.6 (defining adequate consent to sexual contact 
as “acting freely and voluntarily”). 
34 See generally JOHN EARMAN, A PRIMER ON DETERMINISM (1986).  Determinism means, 
roughly, that all events are caused by the laws of nature operating on prior states of the 
world.  There are, however, many ways of conceptualizing determinism.  It is possible to 
conceptualize a fully causal universe as probabilistic rather than deterministic, which is why 
the locution “universal causation” is used. 
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the charges against them or that they are about to be executed and some 
people do not.  Some offenders act and some do not.  Some people form 
prohibited mental states and some do not.  Some people are legally insane 
or act under duress when they commit crimes, but most defendants are not 
legally insane or acting under duress.  Moreover, these distinctions matter 
to moral and legal theories of fairness about competence and responsibility 
and to consequential concerns that we have reason to endorse.  Thus, law 
addresses problems genuinely related to competence and responsibility, 
including consciousness, the formation of mental states such as intention, 
knowledge and comprehension, the capacity for rationality, and 
compulsion, but it never addresses the presence or absence of free will, the 
alleged ability to act uncaused by anything other than one’s own self. 
When most people use the term free will or its lack in the context of 
criminal law, they are typically using this term loosely as a synonym for the 
conclusion that the defendant was or was not criminally competent or 
responsible.  They typically have reached this conclusion for reasons that 
do not involve free will, such as that the defendant was legally insane or 
acted under compulsion.  But such usage of free will only perpetuates 
misunderstanding and confusion because it conflates claims about genuine 
excusing conditions with the radical, general critique of responsibility that 
determinism allegedly presents.35  Recall that free will is not a criterion in 
any criminal law doctrine.36  Thus, once the legal criteria at issue have been 
met, the defendant will be excused or found incompetent without any 
reference whatsoever to free will as an independent ground for the decision.  
Criminal justice system participants and scholars would do well to avoid 
using the term, “free will.” 
There is a genuine metaphysical problem about free will, which is 
whether human beings have the capacity to act uncaused by anything other 
than themselves and whether this capacity is a necessary foundation for 
 
35 See, e.g., Moore, 486 F. 2d at 1139.  Moore appealed from a conviction for possession 
of heroin by claiming that he was entitled under common law criminal responsibility 
principles to a compulsion excuse because he was an addict and was therefore acting under 
compulsion when he possessed heroin.  Moore essentially claimed that his behavioral 
controls were impaired.  Id. at 1144.  This is a standard type of excusing claim, as the 
plurality opinion recognized, but it then went on to equate loss of control with lack of free 
will.  Id. at 1145–46.  The plurality appeared to recognize that it was using lack of free will 
as a synonym for a traditional excusing condition, but using the free will locution lends itself 
to anxieties about the more radical critique.  If the opinion did not use the term, free will,  no 
change in the substantive analysis would have followed and much clarity would have been 
gained by limiting the analysis to whether recognizing a defense for impaired behavioral 
controls was a wise legal outcome. 
36 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
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holding anyone legally or morally accountable.37  Philosophers and others 
have debated these issues in various forms for millennia and there is no 
resolution in sight. Indeed, the problem may not be resolvable.  This is a 
real philosophical issue, but it is not a problem for the law.  Solving the free 
will problem might have profound implications for criminal law doctrines 
and practices, such as blame and punishment, but, at present, having or 
lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of any criminal law doctrine. 
Neuroscience and genetics are simply the most recent mechanistic, 
causal sciences that appear deterministically to explain behavior.  They thus 
join social structural variables, behaviorism, and other scientific 
explanations that have also been deterministic explanations for behavior.  In 
principle, however, these sciences add nothing new, even if they are better, 
more persuasive science than some of their predecessors.  As long as free 
will in the strong sense is not foundational for just blame and punishment 
and is not a criterion at the doctrinal level—which it is not—the truth of 
determinism or universal causation poses no fundamental threat to criminal 
law doctrines or practices.  Science may help shed light on folk 
psychological excusing conditions, such as automatism or insanity, for 
example, but the truth of determinism and the lack of free will are not 
excusing conditions in criminal law.  The law will be fundamentally 
challenged only if science can conclusively demonstrate that the law’s folk 
psychology, which fundamentally depends on mental states, is wrong, and 
that we are not the type of creatures for whom mental states are causally 
effective.38  This is a different question from whether the truth of 
determinism undermines current legal conceptions of competence and 
responsibility. 
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is caused, but 
causation per se is not a legal or moral mitigating or excusing condition.  I 
have termed this confusion “the fundamental psycholegal error.”39  At most, 
causal explanations can only provide evidence concerning whether a 
genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was present.  
For example, suppose a life history marked by poverty and abuse played a 
predisposing causal role in a defendant’s criminal behavior.  Or suppose 
that an alleged new mental syndrome played a causal role in explaining 
criminal conduct.  The claim is often made that such causes, which are not 
 
37 See generally ROBERT KANE, FREE WILL: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION (2006) 
(providing a complete, balanced account of the debate). 
38 Part VII infra addresses this challenge directly.  See generally Katrina L. Sifferd, In 
Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law, 25 LAW & PHIL. 571 
(2006) (providing an extensive defense of the use of folk psychology that underpins criminal 
law and claiming that criminal law does not need a substitute).   
39 Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592–94 (1994). 
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within the actor’s capacity to control rationally, should be an excusing or 
mitigating position per se,40 but this claim is false. 
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufficient causal 
conditions without which the behavior would not have occurred.  We 
sometimes do not know the whole causal account, but this does not mean 
that the behavior is uncaused.  If causation were an excusing condition per 
se, then no one would be responsible for any behavior.  The fundamental 
psycholegal error is thus an external, radical challenge to all conceptions of 
responsibility.  Some people welcome such a conclusion and believe that 
responsibility is impossible, but this is not the legal and moral world we 
inhabit.41  The law holds most adults responsible for most of their conduct 
and genuine excusing conditions are limited.  Thus, unless the person’s 
history or mental condition, for example, provides evidence of an existing 
excusing or mitigating condition, such as lack of rational capacity, there is 
no reason for excuse or mitigation.42 
Even a genuinely abnormal cause is not an excusing condition.  For 
example, imagine a “career” armed robber who suffers from clinical 
hypomania.43  Suppose our robber never robs except when he is in a 
hypomanic state because only then does he feel sufficiently confident and 
energetic to rob.  If he is charged with an armed robbery committed while 
he is hypomanic, his clinical condition played a causal role in explaining his 
criminal conduct, but no excusing condition necessarily obtains.  The legal 
outcome would depend on whether he lacked sufficient rational capacity to 
be held responsible.  If, for example, he had a delusional belief about what 
 
40 See, e.g., Anders Kaye, Powerful Particulars: The Real Reason the Behavioral 
Sciences Threaten Criminal Responsibility, 37 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 539 (2010); Anders Kaye, 
Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1116 (2005). 
41 E.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing 
and Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN 207, 217–18 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 
2006). 
42 Characterizing an excusing claim by the cause of that claim perpetuates the 
fundamental psycholegal error.  For example, in United States v. Moore, discussed supra 
note 35, the concurrence variously characterized Moore’s claim as an “addiction” or “drug 
dependence” defense.  United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1160, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(Leventhal, J., concurring).  Judge Leventhal did recognize that impaired behavioral control 
was the heart of Moore’s claim, id. at 1178, but such characterizations of defenses based on 
causes tends to beg the question of responsibility.  The question is not whether Moore’s 
unlawful possession of heroin was caused (in part) by his addiction.  Of course it was. The 
questions are whether there ought to be a defense of impaired self-control in this type of case 
and, if so, did Moore meet its criteria?  Simply being an addict does not answer the latter 
question.  Lack of control must be proven independently. 
43 DSM, supra note 3, at 365–68.  Diagnostic features include elevated mood, inflated 
self-esteem, decrease in need for sleep, and an increase in goal-directed functioning.  
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he was doing, then the genuine excuse of legal insanity might be 
appropriate.   
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition, but 
causation, including brain causation, is not the equivalent of compulsion.  
Compulsion may be either literal or metaphorical and normative. If 
compulsion is literal, say, a person’s arm moves because the person had a 
neuromuscular spasm or because a much stronger person pushed the arm, 
the person has not acted at all.  Metaphorical compulsion is more difficult 
to understand.  It involves situations in which the person does act, but there 
is reason to believe that he did not act as he otherwise would wish because 
the agent was placed in a “compelling” situation through no fault of his 
own.  It includes cases in which someone acts in response to an externally-
produced do-it-or-else threat (such as the excuse of duress) or acts in 
response to strong internal urges or desires (such as the control test for legal 
insanity).  In all metaphorical compulsion cases, the person acts, however, 
and deciding when to mitigate or excuse in such cases is a normative legal 
question. 
It is crucial to recognize that most human action is not plausibly the 
result of either type of compulsion, but all human behavior is caused by its 
necessary and sufficient causes, including brain causation.  Even abnormal 
causes are not compelling.  Suppose, for example, that a person with 
pedophilic urges feels those urges weakly and has a weak desire for sex 
generally.  If the person molested a child, there would be no ground for a 
compulsion excuse.  If causation were per se the equivalent of compulsion, 
all behavior would be compelled and no one would be responsible.  Once 
again, this is not a plausible account of the law’s responsibility conditions.  
Causal information from science might help us resolve questions 
concerning whether legal compulsion existed, or it might be a guide to 
prophylactic or rehabilitative measures when dealing with plausible legal 
compulsion. But causation is not per se compulsion. 
Causal or correlational knowledge can enhance the accuracy of 
behavioral predictions, which are a feature of every form of preventive 
detention, but predictability is also not per se an excusing or mitigating 
condition, even if the predictability of the behavior is perfect.  To 
understand this, just consider how many things each of us does that are 
perfectly predictable for which there is no plausible excusing or mitigating 
condition.  Even if the explanatory variables that enhance prediction are 
abnormal, excuse or mitigation is warranted only if a genuine excusing or 
mitigating condition is present.  For example, recent research demonstrates 
that a history of childhood abuse interacting with a specific genetically-
produced enzyme abnormality that affects neurotransmitter levels increases 
the risk that a person will behave antisocially as an adolescent or young 
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adult.44  The study showed that an adult male with this particular genetic 
abnormality is 9.8 times more likely to be convicted of a violent crime if he 
also has a history of childhood abuse.45  Does that mean per se that an 
offender with this gene-x-environment interaction is not responsible, or less 
responsible?  No.  The offender may not be fully responsible or responsible 
at all, but not because there is a causal explanation that enhances 
predictability.  What is the intermediary excusing or mitigating principle?  
Are these people, for instance, more impulsive?  Are they lacking 
rationality?  What is the actual excusing or mitigating condition?   
Again, causation is not compulsion, and predictability is not an excuse.  
If an offender is caused to do something or the action or behavior is 
predictable does not mean the offender is compelled to do the crime 
charged or is otherwise not competent or responsible.  Legal policymakers 
and decisionmakers and advocates should always focus on genuine 
responsibility and competence criteria and should avoid the distractions and 
confusions just discussed. 
III. PRETRIAL ISSUES 
This Part of the Article addresses the main pretrial contexts in which 
mental disorder may be relevant: competence to waive rights during the 
investigational stage, forensic evaluations and the right to an expert, 
competence to stand trial, including the right of the state to involuntarily 
commit and medicate an incompetent defendant, and competence to plead 
guilty, which includes the waiver of trial related rights.  I suggest that in 
appropriate cases, mental disorder should invalidate a confession in the 
absence of wrongful conduct by the police, that the right to an independent 
mental health expert should be expanded, that the bar for competence 
should generally be low, that the state has a significant interest in forcibly 
medicating a defendant incompetent to stand trial, that incompetence to 
stand trial commitments should not be used as substitutes for punishment or 
as a form of preventive detention, and that competence to stand trial 
procedures should be reformed. 
A. INVESTIGATION 
The defendant’s primary constitutional rights during the 
investigational stage are the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and the right to remain silent.  Like virtually all constitutional 
rights, these rights may be waived, even by suspects in custody.  For a 
 
44 Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated 
Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002). 
45 Id. at 853. 
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waiver to be valid, it generally must be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.46  At the investigative stage, the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
waiver must be voluntary, which is considered according to a totality of the 
circumstances test.47  In some instances, the waiver must also be explicitly 
knowing or intelligent.48  If a defendant’s rational capacities are 
substantially impaired and he has a grossly irrational reason for waiving his 
rights, or if he does not understand what he is doing by giving them up, then 
the waiver is not knowing and intelligent.  Some would claim that mental 
disorder can “compel” a person to waive their rights, even if they do know 
what they are doing.  For example, suppose a defendant confesses because 
he has auditory hallucinations and “the voices” tell him he must do so.  
Why the defendant is “compelled” to obey the voices is an open question, 
but a simpler explanation for why the waiver is invalid is that the defendant 
does not know what he is doing in the fundamental sense.  He would not 
confess but for irrational stimuli—the voices—that are unrelated to any 
rational reason why he should confess. 
The Supreme Court has discussed waiver in many cases involving 
investigation issues, but virtually never in cases involving mental disorder.  
Colorado v. Connelly is an exception.49  Completely unbidden, Connelly 
confessed a murder to a Denver police officer who had behaved 
unexceptionably.50  The officer immediately warned Connelly of his 
Miranda rights and neither he nor any other officer behaved coercively or 
deceptively towards Connelly, who nonetheless repeated his confession.51  
Connelly was apparently psychotic at the time and was responding to 
psychotic considerations when he confessed.52  The Supreme Court of 
Colorado held that Connelly’s “waiver” of his right to remain silent was 
invalid and the United States Supreme Court reversed.53  The Court 
reasoned that the police officers had acted completely correctly and the 
 
46 See JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY 89 (2009). 
47 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 249–
55, 315–51 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the test in the context of search and seizure and self-
incrimination). 
48 E.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (waiver of the right to a trial must 
be knowing and voluntary).  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Godinez characterized the 
standard as “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”  Id. at 403. 
49 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
50 Id. at 160. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 161. 
53 Id. at 159.  Of course, Connelly did not explicitly waive his right to remain silent, but 
his uncoerced confession had precisely this effect. 
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waiver was not the result of state action.54  Thus, admitting the confession 
was not a constitutional error.55 
I concede that the officers behaved well, but the case is nonetheless 
wrongly decided legally and certainly as a matter of policy.  Citizens have 
an absolute right to remain silent and to be free of an unwanted search in 
the absence of probable cause or its variants unless they waive those rights.  
To blame and punish a citizen who has waived his rights not on the basis of 
conscience or some other potentially rational motive, but rather on 
psychotically grounded reasons is unfair.  If a mentally disordered 
defendant can avoid a “freely made” contract because it is later determined 
that he was incompetent to contract, for example, or if we cannot 
experiment on a subject who “freely” gave consent if it is determined that 
the consent was incompetent, then it is wrong to use the fruits of an 
incompetent waiver of the rights to remain silent and to be free of a search 
against a criminal defendant.  If it violates the dignity of the trial process to 
try an incompetent criminal defendant who could nonetheless receive a fair 
trial on the merits, it seems equally violative of the dignity of the criminal 
process to convict a defendant based on admittedly credible evidence that 
was discovered only because the defendant was grossly out of touch with 
reality. 
If people are not competent, they should not be treated as if they are 
unless there is the strongest consequential ground to do so.  In cases like 
Connelly’s, it may be impossible to bring the suspect to justice unless 
immediate and less direct fruits of the incompetent waiver are used.  This is 
a genuine cost, but there are at least five reasons why imposing it will not 
be a major problem.  First, the standards for competence to waive one’s 
rights are generally quite low and few people will fail to meet them.56  
Although this may seem harsh, setting the competence bar low has the 
 
54 Id. at 167. 
55 Id. 
56 I know of no study that examined this precise question, but standards for competence 
in the criminal justice system are generally low.  See, e.g., NORMAN G. POYTHRESS, RICHARD 
J. BONNIE, JOHN MONAHAN, RANDY OTTO & STEVEN K. HOGE, ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: 
THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 50 (2002) (claiming that only 10–30% of defendants referred for 
competence evaluation are found incompetent, a number characterized as infrequent); 
HENRY J. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP? DEFENDANTS INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 7 (1979) 
(finding that in one full year only 539 defendants were found incompetent to stand trial in 
New York State).  Poythress et al.’s and Steadman’s data are entirely consistent with the 
general belief based on experience that the standards are low.  We do not know how many 
confessions or consents to search are the result of severe mental disorder in the absence of 
police misconduct, but indirect evidence that the standard is low is provided by the general 
finding that appellate courts seldom overturn a finding of voluntariness absent police 
misconduct.  James S. Wulach, Psychological Evaluation of the Consent to Search, 18 J. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 319, 327 (1990). 
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effect of providing enhanced autonomy and respect to citizens.  Second, 
there are no good data on how often a defendant incompetently waives his 
or her rights whether or not he or she is in custody, but my guess based on 
my experience is that it happens infrequently.  Third, law enforcement may 
be able to obtain enough data independently to secure a conviction.  That is, 
the evidence gained by the incompetent waiver may be additive rather than 
crucial.57  Fourth, although the defendant may not be brought to justice, the 
case will at least be cleared (assuming that the defendant is guilty).  The 
waste of scarce resources will thereby be avoided as law enforcement can 
stop trying to solve the crime.   
Last, if the defendant poses a continuing danger to the community, 
standard involuntary civil commitment can be used to deal with such 
dangerous agents.  Traditional involuntary civil commitment is a form of 
preventive detention applied to non-responsible but dangerous people who 
allegedly need to be restrained.  Using traditional involuntary civil 
commitment to restrain disordered agents who committed serious crimes is 
a serious problem, however, because the agent may still be very dangerous 
and contemporary commitment terms tend to be relatively brief and will not 
restrain the person as successfully as imprisonment or commitment 
following an insanity acquittal.58  Such cases will surely be few, but they 
are a danger.   
Perhaps the best solution would be a new form of potentially lengthy, 
secure involuntary commitment for those defendants who cannot be 
successfully tried as a criminal without the evidence obtained by the invalid 
waiver.  This would be a clear instance of preventive detention.  In such 
cases, however, we should insist that the State prove that the defendant did 
commit the crime to differentiate the subject from the subject of traditional 
involuntary commitment.  Criminal responsibility and punishment are not 
in issue, however, so there would be no problem using the illegally obtained 
evidence for civil commitment.  In addition, the State should prove that the 
defendant is mentally disordered and dangerous, and the defendant should 
have full due process protections and the right to periodic review.59  For 
 
57 For example, independent evidence the police discovered prior to the confession may 
be sufficient to link the defendant to the crime. 
58 Most traditional involuntary civil commitment has abandoned indefinite terms of 
commitment and terms infrequently exceed six months.  SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL, JOHN PARRY 
& BARBARA A. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 72 (3d ed. 1985); see, e.g., 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5250 & 5300 (West 2010) (providing that people who are 
dangerous to others as a result of mental disorder may be committed for fourteen days, but 
can be detained for an additional 180 days if necessary).  This is hardly lengthy confinement 
for a person who may have committed a serious crime and may still be quite dangerous. 
59 Some dangerous people might still be uncommittable.  Imagine a defendant who 
invalidly waives his rights as a result of mental disorder and the State needs the evidence to 
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example, the types of protections applied to sexual predator commitments,60 
including the right to full adversary counsel and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, should be provided because so much loss of liberty is at stake.  
Automatic review should be frequent, the review should be thorough and 
include a hearing, and some provision for permitting the person committed 
to challenge the commitment between automatic reviews should be 
available.61 
I do not generally favor lengthy forms of involuntary commitment 
because they tend to be abused by keeping people hospitalized longer than 
is necessary, but I prefer this concededly imperfect compromise to an unfair 
criminal conviction.  At the least, the case is cleared and the agent can be 
released if he is no longer mentally disordered and dangerous.  Society 
would be protected, treatment would be available if the subject is treatable, 
and due process protections would limit the risks to the subject’s liberty. 
B. FORENSIC EVALUATION AND THE RIGHT TO A MENTAL HEALTH 
EXPERT 
Pretrial forensic evaluations are routine both to determine various 
competencies and to evaluate legal insanity and the negation of mens rea.  
This subpart addresses the issues forensic evaluations create. 
In the case of competence evaluations, the defendant seldom has his 
own expert.  State-appointed forensic professionals are virtually always the 
only experts who examine the defendant.62  In Estelle v. Smith,63 the 
Supreme Court held that an expert who had examined the defendant to 
evaluate competence to stand trial was barred by the Fifth and Sixth 
 
obtain a conviction.  Between the waiver and the commitment, however, the defendant 
regains his mental health and is no longer committable.  I assume that, as a technical matter, 
such a person would have to be released.  I also assume that it would virtually never happen. 
60 See infra subpart VI.A, for a discussion of sexual predator commitments. 
61 Some jurisdictions already have special forms of lengthy commitment for certain 
classes of especially dangerous people who have been charged with a crime but have not 
been convicted, and who are non-responsible and dangerous to others.  See CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE §§ 5008(h)(1)(B) & 5350 (West 2010) (providing for “conservatorships” for 
people who are permanently incompetent to stand trial; conservatorships are for a year and 
may be renewed annually; the placement may be in a secure facility if necessary).  The 
people committed in such cases are genuinely not responsible, and thus properly qualify for 
disease jurisprudence, unlike the case of most subjects of sexual predator commitments, 
which I discuss in subpart VI.A, infra. 
62 See STEADMAN, supra note 56, at 39.  Steadman also found that hearings generally 
were routinized and brief.  Id. at 45–48.  I know of no more recent data that contradicts these 
observations and they are entirely consistent with my experience.  There are exceptions if the 
defendant retains his own expert or is entitled to name one.  See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE 
§ 1369 (a) (2010) (a defendant not challenging his own competence may name an evaluator). 
63 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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Amendments from testifying for the prosecution at a capital punishment 
hearing about the defendant’s dangerousness based on the competence 
evaluation.64  Such testimony would not be barred only if the defendant 
competently waived his right to remain silent after consulting with counsel 
and after being adequately warned about the possible consequences.65  If the 
defendant did not waive his right to remain silent, then the court-ordered 
evaluation could still proceed but the results could only be used to 
determine competence.66  The Court recognized that whether the Fifth 
Amendment’s protections apply depends on the possible consequences of 
the defendant’s statements, rather than on the type of proceeding at issue.67  
The sentencing phase of a capital punishment case was clearly of sufficient 
gravity.  Estelle was correctly decided and little more needs to be said about 
this issue.  Evidence obtained to determine competence should not be used 
for guilt or penalty determinations without the defendant’s consent.  As the 
Court noted, the prosecution will have to prove its case or support its 
sentencing recommendation with independent evidence.68  This is as it 
should be. 
Suppose defense counsel suspects that a defense to guilt based on 
mental disorder is a plausible claim or simply wishes to evaluate whether it 
is.  Anyone with experience in criminal mental health practice understands 
that mental health experts, typically psychiatrists and psychologists, play a 
crucial role.  Although either the defense or prosecution can succeed with or 
defeat a claim involving mental disorder without using expert witnesses, as 
a practical matter it is extremely difficult and perhaps impossible for the 
defense.69  This is not a problem for wealthier defendants who can retain an 
expert, but it is a major problem for indigent defendants.  Unless an 
indigent defendant has access to an expert paid for by the state, the 
 
64 Id. at 463. 
65 Id. at 468–69. 
66 Id. at 468. 
67 Id. at 462. 
68 Id. at 468–69. 
69 ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 124 (1967) (“Though the cases say 
again and again that expert testimony is not ‘essential’ to raise the insanity defense, it is clear 
that a persuasive case is unlikely to be made on lay testimony alone.”).   
 Although a guilty verdict will typically be upheld even if the defense presents unanimous 
expert testimony that the defendant was legally insane and the prosecution rebuts this 
testimony only with lay witnesses and cross-examination, such cases are rare at the trial 
level.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 453 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that it is difficult 
to succeed without expert witnesses, but that appellate courts uphold verdicts based on lay 
testimony “not infrequently”). 
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defendant will seldom have a fair chance of succeeding with his or her 
claims.70 
In Ake v. Oklahoma,71 the Supreme Court finally recognized the 
unfairness of not providing the defendant with a mental health expert.  It 
noted that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to an adequate 
opportunity to present their claims.72  The Court further held that a mental 
health expert is necessary for this purpose when the defendant has a 
significant claim of legal insanity or needs expert assistance at capital 
sentencing hearings to rebut expert predictions of dangerousness.73  The 
Court left the implementation of the right to the states.74  Although I believe 
the decision is correct, it left open important questions about the extent of 
the right and how it should be implemented. 
The Court’s opinion did not address whether experts also needed to be 
provided to assist the defendant with other claims concerning the relation of 
mental disorder to culpability and sentencing.  A majority of states permit 
defendants to use evidence of mental disorder to negate mens rea, although 
usually with limitations.75  Mental disorder can also be a mitigating factor at 
both capital and non-capital sentencing, and expert predictions of 
dangerousness at non-capital sentencing may need to be rebutted.  In all 
these contexts, the defendant is in peril without expert assistance.  It is 
difficult to understand how these other types of questions involving mental 
disorder can be distinguished from legal insanity and rebutting expert 
predictions at capital sentencing.  It is true that legal insanity is a complete 
defense and that death is “different.”  Nonetheless, mens rea is a crucial 
culpability issue, and in many cases a mens rea negation claim may be 
more important to a defendant than raising legal insanity because the 
defendant can thereby defeat the prima facie case for higher levels of 
offense and avoid potentially lengthy post-insanity acquittal commitments.  
Moreover, sentencing is vitally important to the defendant and raising 
mitigation at capital sentencing is especially important, as the Supreme 
Court recognized beginning with Lockett v. Ohio.76  I assume that most 
courts would order payment for a defense expert for both culpability and 
sentencing claims.  Failure to do so is substantially unfair because a 
defendant with a potentially meritorious claim of innocence or mitigation 
will not be able to raise it effectively. 
 
70 Id.   
71 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
72 Id. at 77. 
73 Id. at 83–84. 
74 Id. at 83. 
75 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
76 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). 
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The more difficult problem is how the right has been implemented in 
many jurisdictions.  Ake has not been interpreted to guarantee the defendant 
a mental health professional that the defense chooses.77  If a defendant has 
resources, he can “shop around” to try to obtain a mental health 
professional who will support his claims, but indigent defendants do not 
have that ability.78  If the professional consulted will not render a favorable 
opinion, the defendant’s mental health-based argument will almost certainly 
fail.  In some jurisdictions with a sizeable number of forensic professionals, 
some experts may have a reputation for being favorable to the defense and 
the problem may be somewhat alleviated.  There is no guarantee, however, 
that even a favorably inclined forensic professional will reach the expected 
conclusion, and the possibility of using a predisposed expert may not arise 
in jurisdictions with fewer forensic specialists.  What is worse, in some 
jurisdictions the defendant may be assigned a mental health professional 
who is an employee of the state and the prosecution may immediately have 
access to the report.79  A state employee inevitably has a conflict of interest.  
The indigent defendant should be entitled to an independent professional, as 
some jurisdictions hold.80  Further, the report should not be disclosed to the 
prosecution unless the defendant decides to go forward with a mental 
health-based argument at trial.  An independent expert’s report should be 
confidential work product unless the claim is raised.  The fruits of an 
evaluation of a potential claim should not be of benefit to the prosecution. 
If the defendant chooses to raise legal insanity or mens rea negation 
after evaluating these possibilities, notice must be given to the state and the 
state is then entitled to have its own expert examine the defendant.81  The 
Supreme Court explicitly approved this practice in dictum in Estelle and 
lower federal and state courts have held that it is constitutional.82  After all, 
for the same reasons that a defendant needs a mental health expert 
effectively to pursue a mental disorder based defense, the prosecution needs 
to obtain its own evaluation to rebut the defense claims.  Various remedies 
have been proposed to cope with the situation in which the defendant 
 
77 E.g., United States v. Osoba, 213 F. 3d 913 (6th Cir. 2000). 
78 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. 
79 Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 963–64 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
80 PARRY, supra note 46, at 131–32. 
81 I address below the question of whether the same opportunity must be provided to the 
prosecution if the defendant chooses to introduce mental health testimony at sentencing. 
82 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 (1981); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th 
Cir. 1967). 
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refuses to cooperate with the prosecution’s expert.83  One such remedy is 
preventing the defendant from calling his own expert to testify at trial, but, 
as a practical matter, in my experience—and there are no good studies of 
this issue—it appears that defendants who raise such defenses seldom fail to 
cooperate. 
Should the defense attorney be present when the defendant is 
examined by the prosecution’s expert?  Courts have rejected such 
arguments on the ground that the attorney’s presence will undermine the 
expert’s attempt to obtain information and could be otherwise disruptive.84  
For example, the attorney might try improperly to caution or to coach the 
client during the evaluation.  There is some truth to these worries, but I 
think that they are exaggerated and that there is good reason to have the 
attorney present.  The examiner inevitably will be wittingly or unwittingly 
selective in his report and testimony about which aspects of the examination 
are focused on.  Moreover, inferences from, and conclusions about, 
particular parts of the examination are subject to subjective interpretation.  
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, psychiatry is not an exact 
science.85  Consequently, it would be very helpful to both sides to be able to 
view the examination of the defendant by the opposing expert.  Both 
attorneys can then have a better sense of whether an evaluation actually 
supports or is consistent with the testifying expert’s inferences and 
conclusions based on the evaluation.  The potential for disruption remains, 
however, so I suggest that all forensic examinations for the purpose of 
evaluating guilt should be videotaped.  This would not be disruptive and 
would allow the type of assessment that would be helpful.  Indeed, in some 
cases, the tapes might be shown to the jury guided by the expert testimony 
about them. 
In cases involving allegedly civil preventive detention, such as sexual 
predator commitments, the subject of the potential commitment is not 
constitutionally entitled to the service of an independent professional and 
seldom has one unless the subject has independent means.  Moreover, the 
subject does not have the right to remain silent.86  Great weight will be 
placed on the testimony of the state-appointed evaluator and the subject’s 
only means of defeating an adverse opinion will be through effective cross-
examination.  There are no data on this question, but I suspect that judges 
and juries seldom find that the subject does not meet the commitment 
 
83 Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic 
Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71, 103 (1981). 
84 United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the claim that the 
State does not need an independent evaluation). 
85 See cases cited in note 25, supra. 
86 E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986). 
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criteria, even if cross-examination is effective.  For example, the subjects 
have typically committed seriously dangerous acts and it is difficult to 
establish the negative that the subject will not commit another dangerous 
act if released.  Most preventive detention commitments associated with 
criminal justice are potentially indefinite.  A subject faced with such a 
drastic loss of liberty should have a right to the services of an independent 
mental health professional to defeat the allegation that he should be 
detained preventively. 
C. COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 
Competence to stand trial raises two sets of issues.  The first is the 
rationale for preventing the trial of an incompetent defendant.  The second 
is what the state may properly do to restore the incompetent defendant’s 
competence.  These issues are related and will be discussed together. 
Ever since Pate v. Robinson87 and Drope v. Missouri,88 it has been 
established that incompetence is an absolute bar to criminal trial.  The 
standards for this form of adjudicative competence vary by jurisdiction,89 
but they essentially involve the defendant’s ability to understand the 
charges and the proceedings and to assist his counsel.90  The rationales for 
barring trial are that the incompetent defendant is less likely to get a fair, 
accurate trial if he or she cannot understand and assist, and that it violates 
the dignity of our criminal process to try to convict a defendant who does 
not really understand what is happening or is unable to help himself avoid 
 
87 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 
88 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975).  Some refer to Dusky v. United States as 
the crucial precedent, but Dusky was simply an interpretation of the federal statute and not a 
constitutional case.  362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
89 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c) (2006) (“unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense”); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1369(a) (West 2010) (“defendant’s ability or inability to understand the 
nature of the criminal proceedings or assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational 
manner as a result of mental disorder”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW, § 730.10.1 (West 2010) 
(“[A] defendant who has a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the 
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense”). 
90 See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical 
Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992).  Professor Bonnie has drawn an influential 
distinction between the capacity to proceed and decisional capacity in the criminal justice 
system.  Id. at 298.  The defendant incompetent to stand trial requires competence to 
continue the criminal process; the defendant pleading guilty must be competent to make a 
current decision about whether to waive his right to trial and attendant rights.  Id.  The 
distinction has been criticized because implicit in a finding of competence to proceed is that 
the defendant will have to make decisions as the process continues.  See Godinez v. Moran, 
509 U.S. 389, 397–400 (1993) (finding no significant difference between the two standards).  
It is nonetheless a useful distinction, as it focuses more precisely on what is at stake. 
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conviction.  In addition, an incompetent defendant is incapable of 
exercising the autonomy and self-determination expected of criminal 
defendants who must make crucial decisions.91  In virtually all cases, the 
incompetent defendant will suffer from severe mental disorder or 
developmental disability (retardation).92 
Defense counsel, prosecution, and the judge have a duty to raise the 
issue of trial incompetence at any time during a criminal proceeding if any 
of these people suspects that a defendant is incompetent.93  The judge then 
will order an evaluation of the defendant, and a hearing will be held if there 
is a substantial issue.  The hearings are seldom fully adversarial, and in 
most cases, the judge will simply rubberstamp the evaluator’s conclusion 
that the defendant is incompetent.94  I suggest that lawyers appointed solely 
to evaluate trial competence would be better evaluators of a defendant’s 
trial competence than mental health professionals because lawyers 
comprehend much better what understanding and assistance are necessary.  
Perhaps the mental health expert will have a better understanding of why 
the defendant is allegedly incompetent, and the clinician is certainly better 
positioned to recommend treatment.  Nonetheless, the cause is usually 
apparent, and why the defendant is incompetent is relevant only to the 
potential treatment to restore competence.  The evaluating professional is 
virtually never involved in the treatment process, so the treatment 
evaluation will have to be made independently in any case.  For now and 
for the foreseeable future, however, the evaluations will be done by mental 
health professionals. 
A defendant found incompetent to stand trial will typically be 
committed to a forensic hospital or forensic unit of a hospital for treatment 
to restore competence.  In the leading precedent, Jackson v. Indiana, the 
Supreme Court held that due process requires that the nature and duration 
of the commitment should bear a reasonable relation to its purpose, which is 
to restore trial competence.95  The Court did not provide much guidance 
about the length of these commitments, and they vary substantially among 
 
91 POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 56, at 45–46. 
92 Id. at 51, 93–95 (finding that defendants with schizophrenia were the most impaired, 
but also finding some overlap among the diagnostic groups). 
93 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).  In practice, defense counsel will have the 
best access to the defendant and will be primarily responsible for raising the issue. 
94 POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 56, at 42 (noting that commentators, but not forensic 
clinicians and judges, disapprove of this practice); STEADMAN, supra note 56, at 54 (noting 
that the court agreed with the mental health recommendation in 92% of cases, a result 
consistent with other studies). 
95 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).  In some jurisdictions, trial competence 
treatment can be performed in the local jail.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369.1(a) (West 2010). 
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jurisdictions.  Thus, although there is only probable cause to believe the 
defendant has committed the crime, he can be incarcerated without trial in a 
secure facility for many years—in some cases as long as the sentence for 
the crime charged—despite the lack of a conviction.96  Although the time 
hospitalized is counted towards any criminal sentence ultimately imposed, 
the hospitalized incompetent defendant is in legal limbo, and incompetence 
can be used as a tactic by both the prosecution and the defense.97  To the 
extent that incompetence commitment is used by the prosecution to 
preventively detain an accused for whom the case may be weak, this is an 
abuse of the incompetence procedures.  The Supreme Court in Jackson also 
held that a defendant who is irreversibly incompetent to stand trial must be 
released from the criminal justice system, but state officials clearly have 
substantial discretion to decide that the incompetence is not irreversible and 
thus to continue what may be improper preventive detention.98 
Finally, the Court suggested, but did not require, that pretrial motions, 
such as to suppress evidence, could be adjudicated, even if the defendant 
were incompetent to stand trial.99  In some cases, this might have the effect 
of ending the prosecution because suppressed evidence is crucial to the 
prosecution’s case, but there are no data about how often such pretrial 
proceedings are used.  In sum, much potential exists for abuse of 
incompetence to stand trial doctrines and practices.  It is time to rethink 
them.  Virtually everything I shall say in what follows has been suggested 
previously,100 but the system does not change and abuses are not curtailed. 
If the criminal process can be halted by the suppression of evidence or 
other pretrial proceedings, it should be.  An incompetent defendant is 
presumed innocent and should have available any pretrial action that can 
halt the prosecution.  The defendant may go free because the constable has 
blundered, but that is the cost of doing business in a system dedicated to 
protecting the rights of defendants.  If the defendant is still mentally 
disordered and non-responsibly dangerous as a result, the state can resort to 
traditional involuntary civil commitment to protect the public.  Once again, 
 
96 PARRY, supra note 46, at 116 (2009). 
97 POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 56, at 49–50. 
98 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.  If the examining or treating mental health professionals 
unanimously conclude that an incompetent defendant cannot be restored, then the state will 
have to use some other means, such as civil commitment, to restrain a permanently 
incompetent defendant who is believed to still be dangerous.  
99 Id. at 741. 
100 E.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-4.13 (1989); 
Robert Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 66 (1972).  I apologize in advance to the many other excellent scholars who 
have written about this. 
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this is an imperfect remedy, but no system of preventive detention can 
guarantee society’s perfect safety and still be consistent with due process 
concerns.  Perhaps the special form of involuntary commitment I suggested 
earlier would be justifiable.101  The defendant may not ever be brought 
properly to justice, but such a commitment is preferable to outright release, 
which is what would happen if the defendant were competent. 
Assume that there is no bar to proceeding with the prosecution other 
than the defendant’s incompetence.  Two possibilities arise.  The first is that 
the defendant cannot receive a fair trial on the merits as a result of his 
incompetence.  If so, the risk of error is too great and the proceeding should 
be stopped.  The second is that the defendant can receive a fair trial on the 
merits despite incompetence.  Present law treats these cases as 
indistinguishable, and on dignity and autonomy grounds they are 
indistinguishable.  If the defendant is incompetent, the process must halt, 
full stop, and the state may attempt to restore the defendant’s competence.  
After exploring the treatment consequences of the present legal regime in 
which trial incompetence necessitates a halt, I shall turn to the possibility of 
trying the incompetent defendant if a fair trial is possible.  This is not 
possible today, but it should be.  Or so I shall argue. 
As noted, developmental disability and severe mental disorder are the 
primary abnormalities related to incompetence.102  Developmental disability 
itself cannot be treated, but it is possible through educational techniques to 
teach a defendant some of the communication or other cognitive skills, such 
as an understanding of the criminal process, necessary to restore trial 
competence.  If such interventions are provided soon and with reasonable 
intensity, the treating personnel can discover in a matter of months and 
perhaps only weeks if the defendant is capable of learning the necessary 
skills. There is utterly no need for long-term hospitalization and its use is 
simply a means to reach another, constitutionally impermissible goal in this 
context, such as preventive detention. 
Severe mental disorder, including psychotic states, is more treatable, 
especially with psychotropic medication.  Psychotropic medication is not a 
panacea, however.  A substantial number of patients do not respond, even to 
the most effective agents.  All the drugs have side effects that can be 
extremely serious and unpleasant, and the drugs do not provide life skills 
that the person did not formerly possess.  Thus, even if the person responds 
 
101 See text at note 59, supra.  If there were no possibility whatsoever that the 
prosecution could ever succeed, then perhaps equal protection might require the State to treat 
incompetent and competent defendants similarly.  In that case, only traditional involuntary 
civil commitment would be available. 
102 See note 90, supra. 
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well to psychotropic medication and regains reasonable cognitive control, 
some educational interventions may also be necessary to prepare the 
defendant for a criminal trial.  Despite the difficulties, medication will be 
the first treatment of choice for most defendants who are incompetent 
because they are out of touch with reality.103   In virtually all cases, a 
determination can be made within six to nine months that the defendant is 
or is not treatable.  There is no need for longer commitment to restore trial 
competence.104  A conclusion of irreversibility can be reached and further 
commitment for restoration is once again preventive detention.  Thus, all 
jurisdictions that permit lengthy restoration commitments are in virtually all 
cases engaged in permitting preventive detention rather than in genuine 
restoration commitment. 105 
In Sell v. United States,106 the Supreme Court addressed whether and 
under what conditions the state could forcibly medicate an incompetent 
defendant for the purpose of restoring the defendant’s competence to stand 
trial.  The Court agreed, as it had previously,107 that citizens have a strong 
 
103 Prescription of psychotropic medication is usually empirically-based because there 
are few established links between a specific diagnostic assessment and a specific drug.  The 
therapist typically starts with one from among a class of drugs that has the highest benefit–
cost profile.  After a trial of a few months, if the patient does not respond, a different drug is 
tried, and so on.  If the patient who is incompetent as a result of psychosis associated with 
schizophrenia has not responded to any drug over the course of six months, then the therapist 
can order clozapine.  Clozapine is effective with a high percentage of non-responders but has 
extremely dangerous, potentially fatal side effects that require careful monitoring.  If the 
patient still fails to respond, then it is reasonably safe to conclude that none of the available 
drug therapies is likely to restore the person’s contact with reality.  See Beng-Choon Ho et 
al., Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders, in TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
379, 414 (Robert E. Hales & Stuart C. Yudofsky eds., 4th ed. 2003).  See generally Lauren 
B. Marangell et al., Psychopharmacology and Electroconvuslve Therapy, in id. at 1047. 
104 Suppose the defendant competently refuses to take psychotropic medication, thus 
preventing the government from restoring his or her trial competence.  It is perfectly possible 
that a defendant with mental disorder might be incompetent to stand trial but competent to 
refuse medication.  Crazy thinking can be relatively domain-specific, diminishing 
competence in some areas of functioning and not in others.  It is also possible that the 
defendant will be incompetent to refuse.  The law is not entirely clear about the 
government’s right to override an incompetent refusal of a committed person, but I shall 
argue that the government should have the right to treat defendants incompetent to stand trial 
whether or not they are competent to refuse treatment. 
105 Most defendants are restored to competence within six months.  POYTHRESS ET AL., 
supra note 56, at 51.  Nonetheless, the potential for lengthy commitment remains and can be 
abused. 
106 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
107 In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court decided under what conditions a 
prisoner could be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs.  494 U.S. 210 (1990).  The 
Court noted that everyone has a substantial liberty interest in being free from unwanted 
medical interventions.  Id. at 221–22.  The Court held, however, that prisoners could be 
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liberty interest in being free of unwanted medical interventions.108  The 
Court nonetheless held that an incompetent defendant could be 
involuntarily medicated if four conditions were met: the treatment was 
medically appropriate, the governmental interest was strong because the 
charges were serious, the treatment would not cause trial prejudice, and less 
restrictive means of restoring competence were not effective.109  The Court 
did express a preference for treating the defendant under an independent 
and less fraught rationale, however, such as the defendant’s 
dangerousness.110  Not all incompetent defendants will satisfy such an 
independent rationale for involuntary treatment and trial courts will have to 
apply the Sell criteria. 
Three of Sell’s conditions are appropriate, but I would go further and 
argue that the government’s interest in trying an accused is sufficiently 
strong in the case of any felony to justify forcible medication of an 
incompetent defendant for the purpose of restoring competence.  A criminal 
prosecution is an extremely serious matter.  Neither the case nor the 
prosecution and defense should remain in limbo while an incompetent 
defendant languishes in a hospital untreated.  The incompetence standards 
and consequences are not meant to be used strategically by either side.  
What is the point of keeping an incompetent defendant in a hospital to 
restore competence if restoration is made impossible by treatment refusal?  
The intrusion of forcible medication is not trivial, to be sure, but neither is it 
so extensive that it should block the progress of the case.  It is not a form of 
thought control or any other type of unjustifiable intervention.  Forcible 
medication simply tries to restore the person’s cognitive control and ability 
to test reality.  Moreover, hospitalization is expensive and should be 
terminated as soon as possible.  Finally, no good alternative presents itself.  
 
forcibly medicated for their own safety or the safety of others if medication was medically 
appropriate and the prisoner posed a danger to himself or others.  Id. at 227.  I will discuss 
Harper in greater detail in subpart V.B, infra. 
108 Sell, 539 U.S. at 178. 
109 Id. at 180–81.  Whether the medication will have an adverse effect on the fairness of 
trial because it alters the defendant’s behavior negatively, such as impairing communication 
abilities, is an important issue.  See id. at 185–86.  Anti-psychotic medication at proper 
dosage levels typically does not sedate the defendant or otherwise impair a person’s abilities.  
Rather, if effective, it restores cognitive functioning and should enhance the defendant’s 
performance.  On the other hand, it may make the defendant appear “normal” to the judge or 
jury, which might undermine a claim that the defendant was legally insane, or it might alter 
the defendant’s demeanor in a prejudicial way.  Such possibilities especially concerned 
Justice Kennedy.  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142–45 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  These potential difficulties could be alleviated by expert testimony and judicial 
instructions. In an extreme case, however, the Sell criteria will not be met. 
110 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–82.  The Court expressed a preference for justifying medication 
according to the Harper criteria.  Id.  
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If the defendant can prevent restoration, rendering him permanently 
incompetent, then the government must dismiss the charges, presumably 
with prejudice, and seek involuntary civil commitment.  As we have seen 
before, however, this is an imperfect remedy.  Once again, perhaps, a 
special form of commitment is needed, but without necessary treatment, 
such commitments are simply warehousing.  If the person could be forcibly 
treated in involuntary civil commitment or in some form of special 
commitment under a different rationale, then perhaps trial competence 
would be restored.  Once the defendant comes to trial, however, he would 
have the option of foregoing treatment again and might lapse into 
incompetence. 
Unless the Supreme Court reverses decades of incompetence 
jurisprudence, it is not possible to try incompetent defendants even in those 
cases in which they could receive a fair trial.  This would solve many of the 
problems raised by Sell or by cases of seeming permanent incompetence, 
allowing final resolution of the criminal justice process.  One may fairly ask 
how we could be sure that the trial would be fair, but I suggest that this 
could be resolved at pretrial hearings.  Everything depends on how 
complicated the issues are and whether difficult strategic choices will be 
necessary in which the defendant would be likely to disagree with the 
attorney’s advice.  We could also adopt various prophylactic rules, such as 
requiring the prosecution to disclose evidence that may not pass the Brady 
threshold of actual innocence evidence, but which arguably favors the 
defense.111  In any case, the issue will not arise frequently because most 
state and federal cases are resolved by plea bargains.  Nonetheless, the 
incompetence process would be rationalized in those cases in which going 
to trial seems optimal and a fair trial was possible despite incompetence.  I 
recognize that this is a controversial suggestion and the procedural 
requirements to guarantee fairness would be complex, but, in principle, this 
is a reform that could work. 
D. COMPETENCE TO PLEAD GUILTY 
In Godinez v. Moran,112 the Supreme Court was asked to impose a 
standard of competence to plead guilty and to waive the right to counsel, a 
so-called reasoned choice test, that was different from the standard for 
incompetence to stand trial.  The argument for doing so was that pleading is 
more complicated than going to trial and therefore a different and 
presumably higher standard was required to satisfy due process.  The Court 
refused to adopt a different test, holding that the competence to stand trial 
 
111 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
112 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
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standard was sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights as long as the 
waiver of the right to trial and other constitutional protections was actually 
knowing and voluntary.113  After all, a defendant might be competent but 
might not actually understand what he is doing as a result of confusion, 
marginal competence, or the like.  In my view, the Court missed the 
theoretical and policy mark although the holding is not self-evidently 
wrong. 
Recall that all competence standards are essentially functional 
rationality tests.  The question is what rational understanding and skills are 
required.  Although competence standards generally should be low, what is 
required can vary according to the context.  Consequently, “one size fits all” 
standards in many contexts make little sense.  For example, some trials are 
complicated and some guilty pleas are not, and vice versa.  It is a fantasy to 
believe that any particular standard, such as competence to stand trial, 
adequately operationalizes the test.  Even if the standard specifies what 
must be understood, it does not specify how much understanding and of 
what type is required.  Is the ability to accurately recite information 
previously provided sufficient or must the agent be capable of a process of 
rational weighing and assessment? 
Although different “skills” may in theory be necessary to accomplish 
different tasks successfully, such as assisting counsel and deciding whether to 
plead guilty, it is not clear that the allegedly higher standard that the Court 
rejected, “reasoned choice,” would make much difference in practice.  
Rational understanding and reasoned choice are both vague formulations 
that provide little guidance.  The test should be a functional and context-
dependent rationality standard, focusing on what skills are demanded in 
a particular context, whichever words are used to express the standard. 
Waiver of distinct constitutional rights implicates distinct rational 
understandings of each right waived.  Thus, a defendant who appears to have 
general rational understanding may appear on close examination to lack that 
understanding for a particular trial right.  If the trial court makes a careful 
inquiry concerning whether a particular waiver is knowing and voluntary, 
the more general and specific inquiries should merge, as the Godinez 
dissent recognized.114  Once again, however, what is necessary is not a 
distinct formulation for competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to 
counsel, but a context-dependent evaluation by the trial court of the 
defendant’s rational capacities necessary in each context.  Finally, if a 
different or higher standard had been imposed, it is not clear that trial courts 
 
113 Id. at 400.  In his concurrence in Godinez, Justice Kennedy characterized the 
requirement as “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”  Id. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
114 See id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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would have behaved differently, and appellate courts would rarely second-
guess a trial court’s substantive determination that a defendant was or was not 
competent. 
Requiring deeper or more detailed rational understanding risks 
parentalism,115 but requiring less risks an unjust outcome.  I have a 
preference for limiting parentalism as much as possible and perhaps the 
Court’s recognition that the defendant must actually waive his rights 
knowingly partially remedies the vagueness of the general test.  On the 
other hand, defining knowing or intelligent is as vulnerable to manipulation 
as defining competence itself.  In short, evaluating any competence case is a 
normatively fraught and difficult enterprise.  I have no easy answer, but 
simply a policy preference for keeping the bar relatively low to let most 
defendants over it.  This will maximize liberty, but the danger is that it will 
also unduly risk the defendant’s ultimate liberty by potentiating the 
possibility of an irrational outcome. 
If the defendant is not competent to plead because he has failed the 
competence to stand trial standard or a state-imposed higher standard, it 
seems clear that a Jackson-type commitment is warranted, subject to the 
same limitations I suggested above.  And, once again, I believe that the 
government should have the right to forcibly medicate incompetent 
defendants who are incompetent because they have lost touch with reality. 
IV. TRIAL ISSUES 
This Part of the Article surveys the many issues at trial that involve 
mental disorder, including the right to proceed pro se, the right to introduce 
evidence of mental disorder to negate the mens rea required by the 
definition of the crime, and various issues raised by the affirmative defense 
of legal insanity.  Whether psychopathy should qualify as a sufficient 
mental disorder to be the basis of an excuse is given special attention.  I 
suggest that the ability to represent oneself should be cause-neutral and 
should be treated functionally, that evidence of mental abnormality that 
plausibly negates mens rea should be freely admissible, that a cognitive 
standard for legal insanity is optimum, and that the alternatives to legal 
insanity are undesirable.  Finally, I offer a proposal for a new, generic 
verdict of “partial responsibility.” 
A. THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE 
Should a criminal defendant who meets the Godinez standard for 
waiving the right to counsel, which is essentially the competence to stand 
 
115 Parentalism is a gender-neutral synonym for paternalism. 
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trial standard, be permitted to proceed pro se if he suffers from serious 
mental disorder?  The constitutional right to proceed pro se announced by 
the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California116 does not depend on the 
defendant’s ability to function as an able defense counsel.  As long as the 
defendant understands the consequences of representing himself, he is 
entitled to do so.  Consequently, one would have thought that as long as a 
defendant with severe mental disorder understood what he was doing, he 
would be entitled to represent himself. 
Nevertheless, in Indiana v. Edwards,117 the Supreme Court held 
otherwise, unpersuasively distinguishing Godinez on the grounds that the 
issue of self-representation was not raised in the previous case and that 
Godinez involved permitting a defendant to represent himself whereas the 
instant case involved a state trying to prevent the defendant from doing so.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer cautioned against trying to apply a 
unitary competence standard to address two very different questions: 
whether a represented defendant is capable of going to trial and “whether a 
defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself.”118  
Instead, Justice Breyer tried to apply a more nuanced understanding of 
competency that properly considered context.  He recognized that a 
defendant with disorder might be able to assist counsel but might 
nonetheless be too disabled to perform basic trial tasks at even a minimal 
level.  He therefore worried that an apparently unfair trial could result.  
Discretion was left in the hands of trial judges to decide if a defendant is 
competent to represent himself. 
This is a difficult issue for those like myself who are advocates for the 
rights of people with mental disorder and who wish to treat them no 
differently from other people.  Let us assume that if the defendant 
represents himself, the trial will not be a complete sham, especially if back-
up counsel or some other prophylactic is used to try to mitigate the dangers 
of self-representation.  On the one hand, if the defendant understands the 
perils of self-representation, including how his own mental difficulties will 
interfere with his performance, why should he not enjoy the usual, 
constitutionally-protected liberty to represent himself that Faretta 
established?  On the other hand, if mental disorder, which affects the 
defendant’s rational capacities, interferes substantially with his abilities 
fully to understand the peril of self-representation or minimally adequately 
to represent himself, the risk of an unfair trial is high.  It is not clear which 
approach best balances the rights of the accused with systemic concerns. 
 
116 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
117 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
118 Id. at 165. 
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I believe the solution lies with a more egalitarian approach to Faretta.  
People might simply be too incompetent to represent themselves for a 
variety of reasons other than mental disorder,119 even if they are competent 
to recognize how badly they will do and wish to represent themselves 
anyhow.  Edwards makes clear that this type of restriction can 
constitutionally be placed on the Faretta right, at least in cases involving a 
defendant with mental disorder, but there seems little reason not to apply an 
“unreasonable trial incompetence” standard to deny the right to represent 
oneself to any defendant who wishes to assert it.  This will mostly apply to 
defendants with disorder, but at least it is a cause-neutral standard that does 
not discriminate against defendants with mental disorder. 
B. NEGATING MENS REA 
In some cases, mental disorder may explain why a requisite mens rea 
was not formed, whether or not it actually prevented the defendant from 
forming it.  A defendant who is making such a claim, which is often 
mischaracterized as the “defense” of “diminished capacity,” is not raising a 
claim of mitigation of responsibility or of excuse; it is simply a denial of the 
prosecution’s prima facie case, which includes the mens rea required by the 
crime charged.  I have termed this the “mens rea variant” of so-called 
diminished capacity.120  For example, in Clark v. Arizona,121 defendant 
Clark shot and killed a police officer who had pulled the defendant over in 
his police cruiser and was in full uniform.  The defendant was charged with 
the aggravated murder offense of intentionally killing a human being 
knowing the victim was a police officer.  The defendant claimed he lacked 
the mens rea because he did not intend to kill a human being and did not 
know the victim was a police officer.  This claim would have been 
incredible, of course, except that the defendant was suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia and had delusions that space aliens were threatening him.  He 
claimed that he actually believed that the victim was a space alien 
impersonating a police officer.  If he were believed—and there was 
evidence consistent with the truth of this belief—he did not intend to kill a 
human being and did not know the victim was a police officer.  In this case, 
 
119 See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., An Examination of the Relationship Between Competency 
to Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and Psychopathology, 26 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 481 (2002) (demonstrating that some defendants are incompetent to plead or to 
stand trial for reasons other than mental disorder). 
120 Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984). 
121 548 U.S. 735 (2006).  All the facts in the following description are taken from the 
Court’s opinion. 
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the mental disorder produced an irrational belief that is inconsistent with the 
formation of mens rea. 
It is also possible that mental disorder explains a failure to form a mens 
rea that is not a result of an irrational belief.  Imagine that a severely 
disordered person is confused and disorganized on the streets of a large city 
in a deserted neighborhood.  It is freezing cold and the person realizes that 
he cannot find his way home and fears freezing.  He therefore breaks into a 
building simply to keep warm.  The police catch him and charge him with 
burglary on the theory that he intended to commit the felony of larceny in 
the building.  In this case, the defendant was surely capable of forming the 
intent to commit larceny and there was no rationality problem about what 
he was doing, but he simply did not form the intent to steal.  His 
disorganization resulting from mental disorder simply helps explain why he 
broke in just to keep warm. 
In most cases, mental disorder does not interfere with the formation of 
mens rea.  The primary effect of mental disorder on the mental states 
required by the definitions of crimes is to give the defendant crazy reasons 
for actually forming the requisite mens rea.  Consider Daniel M’Naghten, 
who delusionally believed that the governing Tory Party of England meant 
to kill him.122  As a result he intentionally killed a person he believed was 
the Tory Prime Minister, Peel, but who was in fact Peel’s secretary, 
Drummond.  M’Naghten intended to kill a human being, but he acted based 
on a deluded reason.  In some cases, however, mental disorder may be the 
only credible explanation for why a defendant did not form the mens rea 
required by the definition of the offense.  If a plausible claim of mens rea 
negation can be made, can the state nonetheless exclude the evidence? 
In Clark, the Supreme Court addressed precisely this issue and held 
that the state could constitutionally exclude all non-observational expert 
evidence of mental disorder that would be introduced to negate mens rea. 123  
The Court approved Arizona’s “channeling” of all such evidence into the 
issue of legal insanity because so-called mental disorder and capacity 
evidence bearing on mens rea would simply confuse the finder of fact.124 
Judge Morris Hoffman and I have severely criticized the Court’s reasoning 
 
122 RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL 
MCNAUGHTAN 10 (2000) (quoting McNaughtan’s first statement to the magistrate after his 
arrest).  Professor Moran provides a full account of the case, including its social, political, 
and legal context, and the correct spelling of the defendant’s last name, which was actually 
“McNaughtan.”  See id. at xi. 
123 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 772 (2006). 
124 Id. at 774–78. 
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in Clark in these very precincts,125 but I will not repeat those arguments 
here.  Rather, I will simply go to the heart of why the Court’s decision is 
unfair. 
Criminal blame and punishment are the most awesome, painful 
exercises of state action towards a citizen.  In our adversarial system of 
criminal justice, the defendant is presumed innocent and the prosecution has 
the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt, including the requisite mens 
rea.  Criminal liability should not be imposed unless the defendant deserves 
such treatment.  Desert is at least a necessary condition of just punishment, 
and the fair ascription of criminal culpability thus requires the presence of 
mens rea, which is the indicator of the degree of the defendant’s fault.  One 
would think that in such a system of justice, fundamental fairness would 
require that a criminal defendant should be given every reasonable 
opportunity to defend against the state’s charge with credible and probative 
evidence. 
There are a number of reasons that a jurisdiction might want to reject 
or limit mens rea variant claims, many of which were discussed in the 
Clark opinion.  Psychiatric and psychological evidence can admittedly be 
scientifically and clinically questionable and sometimes of faint legal 
relevance.  I have been a long-term critic of much forensic mental health 
testimony and remain so.126  Moreover, even good forensic testimony can 
be confusing to lay witnesses.  Despite these problems—and the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged them, including in Clark—mental 
health testimony is routinely and generously admitted in a wide variety of 
civil and criminal contexts because it is considered relevant and probative.  
Indeed, the Court has accepted the admission of expert testimony about the 
 
125 Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity 
and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071 (2007).  The 
decision was disappointing but not unsurprising after Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 
(1966), in which the Court upheld Montana’s complete exclusion of admittedly relevant and 
probative voluntary intoxication evidence to negate mens rea on the grounds that the state 
had valid policy reasons for doing so and that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute 
right to have relevant and probative evidence admitted.  Voluntary intoxication is of course 
distinguishable from mental disorder because the latter is not the defendant’s fault, but the 
Court’s deference to the state rule and justification for it was generalizable. 
126 Morse, supra note 2, at 600–25; Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal 
Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious 68 VA. L. REV. 973 (1982) (providing a detailed 
critique of psychodynamic psychology and forensic testimony that is based on this theory of 
behavior); Stephen J. Morse, The Ethics of Forensic Practice: Reclaiming the Wasteland, 36 
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 206 (2008) (claiming that forensic practice is not an ethical 
wasteland, but recommending major changes to practice).  Although there are still major 
problems with forensic mental health testimony, I believe the situation is much improved 
since I first addressed this, largely as a result of the creation of specialty boards in both 
forensic psychology and psychiatry and the general professionalization of the field. 
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prediction of future dangerousness in capital sentencing proceedings in the 
face of virtually unanimous professional opinion that such predictions were 
too inaccurate to be the basis of a death sentence.127  The Court held that 
such weaknesses were matters of weight rather than admissibility and could 
be exposed through cross-examination and by opposing witnesses.128  If 
such prosecution testimony is admissible to put a defendant to death, how 
can it be fair to prevent the defendant from negating the prima facie case by 
using credible, relevant, probative testimony that is admissible in every 
other legal context? 
The “channeling” of mental abnormality evidence into legal insanity 
claims is no remedy for the inconsistency because the mens rea variant is a 
claim entirely distinct from legal insanity, even if the evidence used is 
similar for both claims.  In the former case, the defendant claims, “I didn’t 
do it”; in the latter, the claim is, “I did it, but I’m not responsible.”  How 
can it be fair to permit the prosecution to use abnormality evidence to put a 
defendant to death but to prevent the defendant from using credible and 
probative evidence that he or she did not commit the crime charged in the 
first place? 
A related rationale for denying or limiting mens rea negation is that it 
“undermines” the insanity defense.  It is not clear precisely what this 
rationale means.  Some courts reject the mens rea claim because they 
appear to assume that this claim is a lesser form of legal insanity and thus a 
mitigating (but not fully excusing) affirmative defense that should be 
adopted by legislatures rather than by courts,129 but this is a confusion.  
Roughly speaking, the insanity defense is based on the premise that the 
legally insane defendant substantially lacks rational capacity or the capacity 
to control his or her criminal behavior.  The mens rea claim does not 
specifically address either capacity, however.  It simply addresses whether 
the defendant possessed the mental state required by the definition of the 
crime. 
A better argument is that a defendant who successfully raises the mens 
rea variant may negate all mens rea and thus would simply be acquitted and 
freed.  In contrast, an insanity acquittee will be involuntarily civilly 
committed.  Moreover, the mens rea claim will be easier to establish than 
the legal insanity claim.  Success in the former case requires casting only a 
reasonable doubt on the prosecutor’s case whereas the burden of proof for 
 
127 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
128 Id. at 896–903. 
129 State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 526–33 (Ohio 1982) (partially conflating the mens 
rea and partial responsibility variants of diminished capacity and suggesting that the 
legislature and not the court should adopt this “defense”) (quoting Bethea v. United States, 
365 A.2d 64, 92 (D.C. 1976)). 
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affirmative defenses like legal insanity may be placed on the defendant, 
which significantly reduces the defendant’s chance of succeeding.130  Thus, 
permitting the mens rea claim may compromise public safety more than the 
insanity defense—a point to be addressed immediately below—but this is 
distinguishable from claiming that the insanity defense is thereby 
undermined.  As we have seen, criminal liability should not be imposed 
unless the defendant deserves such treatment and a defendant does not 
deserve blame and punishment for a particular crime unless he possessed 
the mens rea required by the definition of that crime.  The defendant can 
avoid unjust blame and punishment either by negating mens rea or by 
establishing an affirmative defense.  Mens rea and legal insanity are 
independent doctrines.  Both implicate public safety, but, more 
fundamentally, they are aimed at doing justice.  Permitting the defendant to 
negate mens rea achieves justice independently rather than undermining the 
justice the insanity defense achieves. 
Perhaps the strongest reason for limiting or rejecting the mens rea 
variant is the fear for public safety, a concern that might be the underlying 
foundation for the claim that the mens rea variant undermines the insanity 
defense.  It is true that mens rea variant claims present cases in which fair 
ascriptions of culpability and public safety might conflict.  The defendant 
who lacks the mens rea required by the definition of the crime is simply 
less culpable.  But a defendant with a sufficiently severe mental 
abnormality to negate mens rea may also be a serious danger to the public 
because such severe abnormalities also suggest that the defendant’s general 
capacity for rationality is diminished in situations in which criminal 
conduct occurs.  A defendant who succeeds with a negation of mens rea 
claim will be convicted of a lesser offense that carries lesser penalties or 
perhaps will be completely acquitted.  Consequently, the defendant will be 
incapacitated by imprisonment for a shorter period than if he or she had 
been convicted for the offense charged or acquitted by reason of insanity 
and then civilly committed. 
The fear for public safety is genuine but overwrought.  As noted, the 
effect of mental disorder, including severe mental disorder, is seldom to 
negate the “subjective” mens reas, such as purpose, knowledge, and 
recklessness, that are part of the definitions of crimes.  Mental disorder may 
 
130 HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY 
DEFENSE REFORM 84–85, 144–46 (1993).  This study found that shifting the burden of 
persuasion caused a decline in the number of insanity pleas raised and that the presence of a 
major mental disorder was a necessity for success.  It also found, however, that among the 
very few defendants in New York who did raise the defense, the success rate increased.  This 
seemingly paradoxical effect was almost certainly caused because the defense was probably 
raised in only the clearest cases after proving insanity became more difficult.  
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give people irrational reasons to form the mens rea, but it almost never 
interferes with formation of that mental state.  There are instances in which 
subjective mens rea is entirely negated, but they are few, indeed.  
Moreover, no defendant can use evidence of mental disorder to negate 
negligence because failing to recognize a risk the defendant should have 
recognized because the accused is abnormal is per se unreasonable.  There 
are attempts to “individuate” the reasonable person standard by endowing 
the reasonable person with the characteristics of the accused, such as being 
mentally abnormal, but this abandons objectivity altogether.131  After all, 
what does it mean to talk of the “reasonable abnormal” person? 
In short, even if a jurisdiction permitted a defendant to negate mens 
rea without any restriction whatsoever, public safety would scarcely be 
compromised and greater individual justice would be gained.  I propose that 
this is precisely the rule that should be adopted and it is the Model Penal 
Code rule.132  There will be occasions in which defendants raise implausible 
claims about mens rea negation based on mental disorder, but these can be 
limited by pretrial motions to exclude the evidence and similar remedies. 
C. LEGAL INSANITY 
Legal insanity is an affirmative, complete defense to crime.  Forty-six 
states and the federal criminal code have the defense.133  Most have some 
variant of the “cognitive” M’Naghten standard, which asks whether as a 
result of mental disorder the defendant did not know the nature and quality 
of his act or did not know right from wrong.134  A minority also have an 
alternative “control” test, which asks whether as a result of mental disorder 
the defendant could not control his criminal behavior.135  In Clark, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Arizona’s test, which was 
simply the right/wrong alternative in M’Naghten, although it is the 
narrowest conceivable test.136  The Supreme Court has never held that the 
 
131 Stephen J. Morse, The “New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome,” 14 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 
(1995).  For example, H.L.A. Hart has suggested general individuation of reasonable person 
standards for negligence, but recognized that the individuation would be a matter of 
mitigation or excuse and not of “subjective justification.”  HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 153–54.  The most common doctrinal examples of the 
attempt to individuate the reasonable person standard are in cases of self-defense and in 
cases concerning the reduction from murder to manslaughter if the defendant was legally 
adequately provoked and killed in the heat of passion. 
132 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
133 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735,749–53 (2006) (providing a description of the various 
rules and the number of jurisdictions that adopt each). 
134 M’Naghten’s Case, (1843), 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.). 
135 Clark, 548 U.S. at 749–53. 
136 Id. at 742. 
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insanity defense is required by substantive due process.  Further, the state 
supreme courts of four of the five states that abolished the defense in the 
wake of the insanity acquittal of John W. Hinckley Jr. for the attempted 
assassination in 1981 of President Reagan and others137 have upheld the 
constitutionality of abolition.138  A compelling constitutional argument 
could be made for the necessity of the insanity defense, but, as I shall argue 
presently, abolition is a bad policy even if it is constitutional.  First, 
however, let us address a number of issues that need to be clarified. 
Legal insanity is a legal and moral issue, not a medical, psychiatric, or 
psychological issue.  The criteria for finding someone not criminally 
responsible—for deciding who is a fit subject for blame and punishment—
are thoroughly normative.  Thus, the claim that a test is “unscientific” is a 
category mistake.  One may believe that certain types of mental states 
should excuse a criminal who possessed them at the time of the crime and 
may therefore criticize on moral grounds a test that does not include them, 
but that is a normative and not a scientific critique.  A narrow test may be 
morally offensive, but it will not be scientifically erroneous. 
Mental disorder alone, no matter how severe, is not an excusing 
condition even if it played a causal role in explaining the defendant’s 
behavior.  As we have seen, causation per se is not an excusing condition.139  
The moral basis for the insanity defense is that in some cases mental 
disorder affects the defendant’s capacity to act rationally or to control his 
behavior.  These are the genuinely excusing conditions that the other 
criteria for legal insanity address.  The issue is the defendant’s impaired 
practical reasoning.  Excuse is warranted only in those cases in which the 
impairment is sufficient, which is a moral and legal question.  As a practical 
matter, the defendant will have to be out of touch with reality to succeed 
with the insanity defense,140 but many defendants who are concededly 
delusional at the time of the crime may be convicted because their practical 
reasoning about the crime was nonetheless not sufficiently impaired.  For 
example, Eric Clark was incontrovertibly suffering from paranoid 
 
137 For a full account of the case, including substantial excerpts from the trial testimony, 
see RICHARD C. BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE—THE TRIAL OF 
JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (2d ed. 2008). 
138 State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003); Utah v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993); State v. Winn, 828 P.2d 879 (Idaho 1992).  
Nevada also abolished the defense, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that abolition was 
unconstitutional.  Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001). 
139 See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
140 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 130, at 85. 
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schizophrenia, but the court convicted him because it concluded that Clark 
did know that what he was doing was wrong.141 
Much scholarly ink has been spilled and many pixels illuminated about 
specific issues within M’Naghten and its variants, such as whether 
knowledge of right versus wrong means moral or legal wrong and whether 
an allegedly broader substitute for knowledge, such as appreciation or 
understanding, is preferable.  I believe that such debates are beside the 
point.  To begin, the test used does not seem to make much difference in the 
outcome,142 a result I think is best explained by the jury’s rough and ready 
conclusion that the defendant was or was not sufficiently irrational to 
deserve to be punished. 
To the extent that an outcome might turn on moral versus legal wrong, 
the former should be preferred because it is more action-guiding and 
provides a better fit with the underlying rationale for the defense.  Note that 
all crimes for which an insanity defense is typically raised are acts that are 
also objectively and clearly immoral and illegal.  The reason a legally 
insane offender typically commits the crime is primarily because she 
believes that she has a sufficient moral or legal justification for what she is 
doing.  Consider Andrea Yates, who delusionally believed that she needed 
to kill her children while they were still sufficiently pure or they would 
become corrupted and would be tormented in hell for eternity.143  Yates 
knew it was legally wrong to kill her children and she might also have 
recognized that her neighbors might think it morally wrong to do so.  
Nonetheless, from her deluded, subjective point of view, she surely thought 
she was doing the right thing.  If the facts and circumstances were as she 
believed them to be, the balance of evils was positive in this case.  Ms. 
Yates’s knowledge of moral and legal wrong is beside the point, however.  
Although Ms. Yates was instrumentally rational, she deserved to be 
excused because her actions were deeply irrationally motivated through no 
fault of her own. 
Many critics of cognitive tests believe that the word “know” is too 
narrow and that other, apparently broader terms should be used that 
encompass a somehow deeper understanding of what one is doing or that it 
is wrong.144  Every lawyer knows, however, that almost any term used can 
 
141 Clark, 548 U.S. at 745–46. 
142 SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 884 (8th ed.  2007). 
143 Deborah W. Denno, Who is Andrea Yates?  A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2003) (providing a complete account of the case). 
144 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.01, at 166, 169–70 (1985); 
Douglas Mossman, United States v. Lyons: Toward a New Conception of Legal Insanity, 16 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 49, 54–57 (1988). 
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be interpreted more or less broadly to reach the morally preferred result.  
Consider knowledge itself.  Did Ms. Yates know what she was doing?  The 
answer depends on whether one takes a narrow or broad view of such 
knowledge.  Ms. Yates knew that she was killing her children, so she knew 
what she was doing in the narrow sense.  On the other hand, her material 
motive for action—to save the children from eternal torment—was deluded, 
so she did not know what she was doing in a broader sense.  She thought 
she was saving the children, but she was not.  The same could be said of her 
knowledge of moral and legal wrong.  Either result could be obtained by 
narrow or broad readings of “understand,” “appreciate,” or other 
contenders.  Fine-grained parsing of small definitional differences will not 
be helpful to finders of fact.  A legislature can certainly signal by using a 
term different from knowledge that it wishes to adopt a broader reading of 
its cognitive test, but juries will still make a rough and ready judgment and 
the word used has no influence on which expert and lay testimony will be 
admissible.  In practice, the complete clinical picture will be brought to bear 
whichever word is used. 
If a defendant was sufficiently irrational, no separate control test will 
be necessary to excuse him.  Suppose, however, that the defendant was 
rational according to any ordinary definition, but claims that he could not 
control himself.  Such claims are often associated with sexual disorders, 
substance disorders, and impulse control disorders generally.  These are the 
cases in which an independent control test is thought to be necessary.  In the 
wake of John Hinckley’s acquittal by reason of insanity for attempting to 
assassinate President Reagan and others, many legislatures abolished a 
control test for legal insanity.  The American Bar Association and the 
American Psychiatric Association also took positions rejecting the validity 
of control tests.145  Although it may seem unfair to blame and punish an 
otherwise rational agent who cannot control himself, there was good reason 
to jettison control tests.  The primary ground was the inability of either 
experts or jurors to differentiate the defendant who could not control 
himself from one who simply did not.  The presence of mental disorder is of 
no help in this regard because criminal conduct is human action, even if it is 
the sign or symptom of a disease.  Concluding that human action is not 
controllable because it is a sign or a symptom is simply question-
begging.146  An independent demonstration that the conduct could not be 
controlled is required. 
 
145 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 21; Am. 
Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 21. 
146 HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 148–53 (1979). 
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I am an opponent of control tests because I have not encountered a 
convincing conceptual account of an independent lack of control and an 
operational definition of such an incapacity that would permit expert or lay 
testimony to resolve whether a defendant had such a problem.147  I readily 
concede that lack of control may be an independent type of incapacity that 
should mitigate or excuse responsibility, but until a good conceptual and 
operational account of lack of control is provided, I prefer to limit the 
insanity defense to cognitive tests. 
Moreover, I believe that virtually all cases in which a control test 
seems attractive or necessary can be better explained as a cognitive 
problem.  People who are out of touch with reality may have trouble 
controlling themselves in the sense that they cannot be guided by reason, 
but irrationality is the problem.  For example, people with sexual or 
substance disorders may not appear irrational, but they do report intense 
craving and often engage in repetitive actions that can be ruinously costly to 
them.  It seems natural to infer that they somehow cannot control 
themselves.  I suggest that the lack of control arises from the intensity of 
desire that seems to drown out all the competing considerations that most of 
us use to control untoward desires.  In other words, at times of peak arousal, 
people with these problems simply cannot be guided by the good reason not 
to yield to their desires.148  Even if one accepts a control theory of 
mitigation or excuse, in most cases the agent can still be held responsible.  
During those times when arousal is dormant or low, they do have intact 
rational capacity and recognize that they will yield in the future.  It is 
therefore their duty to take whatever steps are necessary, such as entering 
treatment, to insure that they do not offend.  If they do not take such steps, 
they are responsible for not avoiding the condition of their own excuse.  In 
other words, even if sexual and substance disorders were to qualify as a 
sufficient mental abnormality for establishing legal insanity and even if 
people with these disorders were not rational at the time of the crime, a 
successful insanity defense might nonetheless be inappropriate in most 
cases. 
 
147 Morse, supra note 20; Stephen J. Morse, Against Control Tests, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS 449 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009).  The latter was a “target” chapter 
that challenged proponents of control tests to provide the psychological process or 
mechanism that produced lack of control capacity and that could be the focus of testimony 
about it.  Five critics responded to the chapter, but not one even remotely suggested a 
mechanism or process. 
148 See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Science and Criminal Responsibility, in THE IMPACT 
OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 241 (Nita Farahany ed., 2009) (providing a 
fuller account). 
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An interesting and important issue that implicates the mental disorder 
criterion and both the cognitive and control tests is whether psychopathy 
should qualify as a mental disorder for purposes of legal insanity and 
whether at least some psychopaths seem to meet either a cognitive or a 
control test.  Psychopathy is a well-validated mental disorder characterized 
by both conduct and psychological abnormalities.149  For our purposes, the 
most important criteria are lack of conscience, lack of empathy, and lack of 
concern for the rights and interests of other people.  The issue is important 
because psychopathy is highly predisposing to criminal behavior, including 
heightened recidivism,150 and is common among prisoners.151  Psychopaths 
simply do not get the point of morality or the underlying moral basis of 
criminal law prohibitions.  Criminal punishments are simply prices to them.  
It may sound as if such people are simply callous and have an unfeeling 
character, but the dominant understanding today is that they are disordered 
for reasons not yet well understood. 
The Model Penal Code’s insanity provisions excluded from the 
defense a mental disorder “manifested only by repeated criminal or 
otherwise anti-social conduct.”152  Most courts have interpreted this 
provision to exclude psychopathy, but the words of the section do not entail 
this conclusion.153  Repetitive anti-social and criminal behavior is one factor 
 
149 The “gold standard” for measuring psychopathy is ROBERT D. HARE, THE HARE 
PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED (2d ed. 2003).  An earlier, influential clinical description 
is HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (5th ed. 1988).  Although psychopathy is a well-
validated diagnostic entity, it is not included in DSM-IV.  Psychopathic characteristics can 
be of greater or lesser severity.  My discussion will assume that a potentially excusable 
defendant is severely psychopathic.  
150 Kevin S. Douglas et al., Risk for Criminal Recidivism: The Role of Psychopathy, in 
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 533, 534 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (urging caution on 
methodological grounds). 
151 See Thomas A. Widiger, Psychopathy and DSM-IV Psychopathology, in HANDBOOK 
OF PSYCHOPATHY 156, 157–59 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (noting that there is strong 
overlap between psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), but the relation is 
asymmetric; APD is more prevalent among prisoners and virtually all prisoners who score 
high on psychopathy meet the criteria for APD, but not the reverse).  
 Psychopathy must be distinguished from APD, which is included in the DSM.  DSM, 
supra note 3, at 701–06.  APD is diagnosed on the basis primarily of repetitive antisocial 
conduct.  There are only two psychological criterion among the diagnostic criteria, lack of 
remorse and impulsivity, but neither needs to be present to make the diagnosis.  
Psychopathy, by contrast, always includes psychological criteria.  As a result, psychopathy 
might plausibly be a candidate for a mental disorder that would support an insanity defense, 
but APD would clearly not qualify.  Id. 
152 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
153 Indeed, the Model Penal Code makes clear that its provision did not exclude a mental 
condition “so long as the condition is manifested by indicia other than repeated antisocial 
behavior.”  MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.01(2), at 164 (1985). 
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that can increase psychopathy scores, but the diagnosis is not based on this 
factor alone.  Thus, the language of the various tests for legal insanity 
permits a reasonable case for inclusion.  In brief, the argument for excusing 
psychopaths, or at least some of them, is that they lack the strongest reasons 
for complying with the law, such as understanding that what they are doing 
is wrong and empathic understanding of their victim’s plight.154  Most 
people can use empathy, conscience, understanding of the reason 
underlying a criminal law’s prohibition, and prudential reasons to guide 
their behavior.  In contrast, as a result of their psychological deficits, 
psychopaths can be guided only by prudential, egoistic reasons not to be 
caught and punished.  In other words, they cannot grasp or be guided by the 
good reasons not to offend, which could be expressed either as a cognitive 
or control defect.  And according to the same argument, people with lesser 
but still substantial psychopathy should qualify for mitigation.  In response, 
most advocates for continuing exclusion of psychopathy as a basis for the 
insanity defense argue that they are in touch with reality and know the rules 
and it is sufficient for criminal responsibility that psychopaths can reason 
prudentially about their own self-interest.155 
Suppose one accepts on normative grounds, as so many do, that the 
capacity for prudential reasoning is sufficient for criminal responsibility.  
There remains one final argument for excusing at least extreme psychopaths 
based on their lack of even prudential reasoning ability.  According to one 
plausible but controversial, broad characterization of psychopathy, most 
ably advanced by Paul Litton,156 psychopaths are not rational at all because 
they lack any evaluative standards to assess and guide their conduct.  They 
do not even possess evaluative standards related to the pursuit of excitement 
and pleasure.  Litton concludes that “it is not surprising that agents with a 
very weak capacity of internalizing standards act on unevaluated whims and 
impulses.”157  Much of their conduct appears unintelligible because we 
cannot imagine what good reason would motivate it.  In brief, psychopaths 
have a generally diminished capacity for rational self-governance that is not 
 
154 See Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 1 NEUROETHICS 205 
(2008) (providing a fuller account). 
155 Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, 
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 746–47 (1992).  For an intermediate 
position, see Walter Glannon, Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath, 1 NEUROETHICS 158 
(2008) (arguing that psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning and are capable of 
being guided by moral considerations to some degree, but their cognitive and affective 
impairments warrant mitigation). 
156 Paul J. Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and 
Rational Self-Governance, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 349 (2008).  The argument in the text follows 
Litton. 
157 Id. at 382. 
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limited to the sphere of morality.  They cannot even reason prudentially. 
Future research may convince legislatures or courts to accept such an 
understanding of some psychopaths and to extend the insanity defense to 
them, but this is not the current law, even for such extreme cases. 
Finally, in the United States, there is a major practical objection to 
applying the insanity defense to psychopathic defendants.  In all 
jurisdictions, a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may be 
involuntarily committed to a secure hospital facility, a practice that the 
Supreme Court has held is constitutional and that will be discussed in a later 
part of the Article.158  The term of commitment varies, but the Supreme 
Court has upheld an indefinite term159 as long as the acquitted inmate 
remains both mentally ill and dangerous.160  It thus appears that this would 
be a secure form of incapacitation for dangerous psychopaths if 
psychopathy were accepted as a potentially excusing mental disorder.  
Despite the initial attractiveness of this solution to the danger psychopathy 
presents, it is unlikely to be successful.  The insanity defense cannot be 
imposed on a competent defendant who does not wish to raise it,161 and 
virtually no psychopath would raise the insanity defense because at present 
there is no effective treatment for adult psychopathy.  Any psychopath 
acquitted by reason of insanity for any crime would potentially face a 
lifelong commitment to an essentially prison-like facility.  In short, even if 
American law came to the conclusion that psychopaths should be excused, 
few psychopaths would be willing to accept such “lenient” treatment and 
we would still have to rely on a pure criminal justice response.  Thus, the 
only potential solution to the desert-disease gap psychopathy produces 
would be some special form of involuntary civil commitment similar to 
sexual predator commitments.162 
Finally, let us consider proposals to abolish the insanity defense and 
potential alternatives to it.  Abolition of the insanity defense is simply 
unfair and there is no adequate substitute for it.  Some people are so lacking 
in rational capacity through no fault of their own that it would be as unjust 
to blame and punish them as it would be to blame and punish young 
children or people with dementia.  The consequential grounds for abolition 
 
158 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see Part VI.B infra. 
159 Id. 
160 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 (1992). 
161 E.g., United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
162 Sexual predator commitments are discussed in subpart VI.A.  The same conceptual 
and constitutional concerns would apply if a legislature attempted to create a special form of 
commitment for some psychopaths. 
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are unpersuasive,163 so the only potentially convincing ground must be that 
it is not unfair to abolish the defense.  The late Norval Morris tried to make 
such an argument on behalf of the American Medical Association, which 
took a position in favor of abolition in the wake of Hinckley.  Professor 
Morris argued that since poverty is a stronger cause of crime than mental 
disorder and we think it is fair to blame and punish poor criminals, it 
follows that it is fair to blame and punish criminals with severe mental 
disorders.  With respect, however, Professor Morris confused causation 
with excuse, an error discussed in subpart II.C above.  Poor criminals are 
not excused because they do not have rational or control incapacities.  Some 
offenders with mental disorder do have such incapacities, which is why 
they are excused. 
There is no suitable alternative to legal insanity.  The most common 
alternative is to permit evidence of mental disorder to be admitted to negate 
mens rea, but this will fail to do justice and it can lead to morally and 
legally bizarre results.  Mental disorder, even severe disorder, seldom 
negates mens rea; rather it gives the offender a crazy reason to form mens 
rea.  Thus, even those defendants most out of touch with reality will have 
no defensive opportunity unless there is a potential insanity defense despite 
the massive rationality defects they suffer.  Think once again of Ms. Yates, 
whose homicides met all the requirements for premeditated, intentional 
homicide.  In some cases, a defendant charged with premeditated homicide 
might use evidence of hallucinations or delusions to cast doubt on whether 
his intention to kill was premeditated, but then he would still be convicted 
of a lesser form of intentional homicide.  If a defendant has an auditory 
hallucination of God’s voice telling him to kill, conviction of second-degree 
murder would be unjust because the defendant is not rational.  Reconsider 
the facts in Clark.164  If the defendant actually believed he was killing a 
space alien who was impersonating a police officer, then he is not guilty of 
purposeful, knowing, or reckless homicide.  He would be convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter on a negligence theory, however, because his 
deluded mistake was unreasonable.  But this defendant is not negligent in 
the ordinary sense.  He cannot correct the error by being more careful.  He 
 
163 Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 777, 795–801 (1985) (rejecting various consequential and practical arguments 
for abolition).  It is possible that abolishing the defense will increase social safety because it 
will deter both some severely mentally ill defendants who would succeed with the defense of 
legal insanity and some normal defendants who might think that they can fake the defense.  
See HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 48–49 (conceding that 
abolition of all excuses might increase social safety, but arguing that the cost to individual 
rights would be too high).  Such deterrent benefit is entirely speculative, however, and in the 
case of abolishing the insanity defense, the likelihood of achieving these benefits is tiny. 
164 538 U.S. 735, 743–44 (2006). 
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is irrational and does not deserve to be punished at all.  Conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter is morally and legally obtuse in such a case of 
gross lack of rational capacity.165 
Another alternative deserves brief mention: the verdict of “guilty but 
mentally ill” (GBMI).  This verdict has been adopted in a substantial 
minority of states in addition to legal insanity, so it is an alternative rather 
than a replacement.  A GBMI verdict does not indicate reduced culpability, 
it does not require lesser punishment, and it does not provide for 
hospitalization and treatment that would not otherwise be available to the 
convict.  Essentially, the finder of fact is being asked to make a diagnosis in 
addition to a guilt determination.  It is not different from “guilty but 
herpes.”  In short, GBMI is a fraudulent verdict because it does not address 
any issue relevant to just criminal blame and punishment and it has the 
potential to deflect juries from proper insanity acquittals because they do 
not understand the insanity defense or fear that it will cause the release of a 
dangerous offender.166  When GBMI is available, jurors may falsely believe 
that they are “taking account” of the defendant’s impairment and thus may 
improperly return the GBMI verdict when an acquittal of insanity was 
appropriate.  Paradoxically, defendants who raise the verdict may receive 
even harsher sentences, so there is evidence that its use is declining.167 
Finally, should the jury be informed that the outcome of an acquittal 
will be a form of involuntary civil commitment with a potentially indefinite 
term?  In Shannon v. United States,168 the Court held that federal trial courts 
need not instruct the jury about commitment unless the prosecution 
affirmatively misleads the jury about the consequences.  Justice Thomas’s 
 
165 In addition to the mens rea alternative if the insanity defense is abolished, Professor 
Christopher Slobogin’s “integrationist” proposal for abolition should be briefly mentioned 
because it is the only serious contemporary scholarly proposal and interesting in its own 
right.  CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 51–60 (2006).  This proposal would allow the 
defendant to use evidence of mental disorder to indicate that he would have been justified or 
excused if the facts had been as he believed them to be.  The proposal depends, however, on 
adopting a subjectivized view of justification that is unacceptable if the distinction between 
justification and excuse is to be preserved.  It would also fail to acquit many disordered 
defendants who have substantial rationality defects.  Professor Slobogin rejects rationality 
impairments as the basis for legal insanity, but he then inconsistently uses lesser rationality 
to argue that juveniles are less responsible than adults.  The integrationist proposal has been 
subject to a great deal of criticism.  See CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 144, at 
173–92; Morse & Hoffman, supra note 123, at 1123–31.  No legislature has seriously 
entertained adopting the proposal.   
166 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 130, at 102–20 (describing the verdict as a 
compromise). 
167 Id. 
168 512 U.S. 573 (1994). 
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majority opinion focused primarily on the traditional assumption that juries 
should decide whether the defendant is culpable and should not be 
concerned with the consequences of their verdict.169  Although this 
assumption may make sense for the vast majority of cases in which the 
defendant will be imprisoned or freed depending on the verdict—a fact 
jurors know—the insanity defense is the only form of exculpation that does 
not result in the defendant being immediately freed.  I recognize that jurors 
may not fully understand what sentence will follow a conviction, but the 
insanity defense is sui generis because the acquitted defendant is not freed.  
It would be understandable if a juror voted to convict a legally insane 
defendant because the juror feared that a disordered and dangerous person 
might be freed.  Similarly, jurors may be far more inclined to reach the just 
result if they learn that the insanity acquittee will be preventively detained 
by post-acquittal commitment.170  Thus, I conclude that the defendant 
should be entitled to a “consequences” instruction upon request.  I would 
not make it mandatory because, as Justice Thomas recognized, there may be 
situations when the defendant would think it is not in his interest to have the 
jury learn of the consequences. 
D. GUILTY BUT PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
In 2003, I proposed that the criminal law should include a generic, 
doctrinal mitigating excuse of partial responsibility that would apply to all 
crimes, and that would be determined by the trier of fact.171  This partial 
excuse would apply in cases in which a defendant’s behavior satisfied the 
elements of the crime charged, but the defendant’s rationality was non-
culpably and substantially compromised and thus the defendant was not 
fully responsible for the crime charged.172  Current Anglo-American 
criminal law contains no such generic partial excuse.  Some doctrines, such 
as provocation/passion and extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse, appear to operate in effect 
 
169 Id. at 579–80, 586–887.  In fact, Justice Thomas’s entire majority opinion relies on 
the validity of this assumption. 
170 This form of commitment is discussed in subpart VI.B, infra. 
171 Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 289 (2003).  I will use the terms “partial responsibility” and “diminished 
responsibility” interchangeably, but the former should be preferred because there is no extant 
legal doctrine by that name with which the proposed doctrine could be confused.  
Diminished responsibility is probably more accurately descriptive, but there does exist a 
doctrine with which the proposal might be confused.  See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 
25, § 52 (Eng.) (discussing criteria for “diminished responsibility”).  This section came into 
force on October 4, 2010 as a result of Statutory Instrument No. 2010/816. 
172 The defendant could also plead in the alternative any other mitigating or full 
affirmative defense, such as legal insanity. 
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as partial excuses.  They typically apply only in limited contexts, however, 
such as to reduce a homicide that would otherwise be murder to 
manslaughter.173 
Criminal law already recognizes the moral importance of “partial 
responsibility” for determining just punishment.  Despite the lack of a 
generic mitigating excuse and strict limitations on the few doctrines that 
serve this purpose, the relevance of diminished rationality and diminished 
responsibility to sentencing is widely and generally accepted.  For example, 
Atkins v. Virginia,174 which categorically prohibited capital punishment of 
people with retardation on Eighth Amendment grounds, was based 
precisely on this recognition.  The Court wrote, 
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and 
wrong . . . .  Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have 
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to 
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others . . . .  Their deficiencies do 
not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal 
culpability . . . .  With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing that the offender 
gets his “just deserts”—the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily 
depends on the culpability of the offender.175 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also explicitly adopt this principle 
by providing for a reduced sentence if a “significantly reduced mental 
capacity . . . contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.”176  
Although this provision applies only to non-violent offenders, the limitation 
is based on considerations of public safety, rather than on the belief that 
violent offenders never suffer from reduced mental capacity or that such 
incapacity does not affect the culpability of violent offenders.  Even the 
current legislative trend in many jurisdictions towards determinate 
sentencing does not undermine the general acceptance of this view because 
the trend is motivated primarily by concerns with disparate sentencing, 
rather than by the belief that impaired rationality is unrelated to diminished 
responsibility. 
I have long argued that the capacity for rationality is the fundamental 
criterion for responsibility.  Young children and some severely disordered 
defendants are excused not because they are young or ill, but because youth 
 
173 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  The English 
doctrine of “diminished responsibility,” which is quite expansive, is likewise limited to 
reducing murder to manslaughter.  See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 52 (Eng.).  
See generally GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTIAL EXCUSES 
(1998); PARTIAL EXCUSES TO MURDER (Stanley Meng Heong Yeo ed., 1991). 
174 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
175 Id. at 318–19.  Note that these are largely rationality considerations 
176 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2004). 
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and disorder, respectively, are inconsistent with or impair the capacity for 
full rationality.177  Sentencing reduction based on mental abnormality is 
premised upon the same basis.  Provocation/passion and extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance as partially excusing mitigating doctrines are best 
explained by the theory that these conditions non-culpably reduce the 
capacity for rationality.  Finally, the claims for excuses based on newly 
discovered, alleged syndromes are best justified as irrationality claims.  
How much rational capacity must be impaired under what conditions to 
warrant excuse or mitigation is, of course, a moral, political, and legal 
question. 
Present law is unfair because it does not sufficiently permit mitigating 
claims.  Criminal defendants display an enormously wide range of rational 
and control capacities.  Further, there is a substantial range of coercive 
threats that do not amount to the full excuse of duress in cases in which the 
defendant is legally responsible.  In some cases, there may be quite 
substantial impairments or very hard choices, but such defendants simply 
have no doctrinal purchase to argue for mitigation.  If criminal punishment 
should be proportionate to desert, blanket exclusion of doctrinal mitigating 
claims and treatment of mitigation solely as a matter of sentencing 
discretion are not fair. 
To understand the unjustifiable limitations of current doctrine, 
consider the impaired rationality doctrines that reduce a murder to 
manslaughter: heat of passion upon legally adequate provocation, and 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation of excuse.178  Why should these doctrines be limited to 
homicide?  For example, suppose a defendant acting in the heat of passion 
intentionally burns the provoker’s property on the spur of the moment, 
rather than killing the provoker.  Or suppose that an agent suffering from a 
non-culpable state of substantially diminished rationality commits arson.  
Some arsonists and some criminals generally might act with non-culpable, 
substantially impaired rationality that does not meet the standards for a full 
 
177 The Supreme Court confirms this in the case of juveniles.  See Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring unconstitutional application of capital punishment to 
juveniles who committed capital murder at the age of sixteen or seventeen).  The Court listed 
those characteristics of adolescents, such as impulsivity, ill-considered action, and 
susceptibility to peer pressure, as diminishing juveniles’ culpability and cited Atkins for the 
proposition that lesser culpability should lead to lesser punishment, at least in the capital 
punishment context.  Id. at 569–71.  The factors used in both Atkins and Roper to justify 
diminished responsibility are best understood, I believe, as rationality considerations.  In the 
case of juveniles, lesser rationality results from developmental immaturity rather than from 
an abnormality. 
178 Once again, the English “diminished responsibility” doctrine operates similarly and is 
similarly limited.  See supra note 171. 
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legal excuse.  Compromised rationality and its effect on culpability are not 
limited to homicide.  Moreover, such a generic mitigating doctrine would 
be a more just and practical response than either legal insanity or 
subjectivizing justification for claims of reduced responsibility based on 
allegedly newly discovered psychological syndromes.  Fairness and 
proportionality require that doctrinal mitigation should be available in all 
cases in which culpability is substantially reduced. 
I therefore propose the adoption of a new verdict, “guilty but partially 
responsible” (GPR), that would apply to all crimes and that would be 
adjudicated at trial (or would be a new variable in plea bargaining).  This 
would be a true mitigating affirmative defense.  I am not wedded to any 
particular set of criteria for this doctrine.  Any formula, such as the Model 
Penal Code’s “extreme mental or emotional disturbance,”179 that captures 
the essence would be acceptable.  I would require that the impairment 
would have to be substantial, as does the MPC.  The consequence of this 
verdict would be a legislatively mandated reduction in punishment for the 
crime.  I am not committed to any particular reduction scheme, but 
considerations of public safety would have to play a large role in 
determining how much reduction would be possible for various crimes.  
This proposal has been called a “punishment discount,” and so it is.  But 
substantially impaired or coerced defendants deserve to pay a lesser price.  
There are various practical problems that adopting this verdict might create, 
but I argued in the original paper and still believe that these can be solved.  
It is certainly worth trying the experiment in the interest of justice. 
V. POST-TRIAL ISSUES 
This Part of the Article surveys a host of post-trial issues, including 
competence to be sentenced, the right of the government to involuntarily 
medicate prisoners with psychotropic medications or to transfer them to a 
hospital, sentencing, and competence to be executed, including forcible 
medication for the purpose of restoring competence to be executed.  I 
suggest, inter alia, that convicted offenders who are incompetent to be 
sentenced may be forcibly medicated to restore competence, that the 
potential for mitigation of sentence based on diminished responsibility 
should be enhanced and the potential for aggravation based on 
dangerousness should be limited, and that prisoners who are incompetent to 
be executed may be forcibly medicated to restore competence under strictly 
limited conditions. 
 
179 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft1962). 
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A. COMPETENCE TO BE SENTENCED 
This issue does not arise with great frequency because any offender 
about to be sentenced was competent to plead guilty or to stand trial, but an 
offender’s mental condition may have deteriorated between plea or trial and 
sentencing or there may be a specific problem about sentencing that is not 
inconsistent with plea or trial competence.  Criteria vary, but the essential 
question is whether the defendant is capable of understanding what is 
happening to him and why, and is able to speak for himself and to assist 
counsel.180  The Supreme Court has not decided this issue nor established 
constitutional criteria, but I believe it is fair to say that the necessity of 
sentencing competence is assumed for some of the same reasons that 
support the bar on trying an incompetent defendant.  It is inconsistent with 
both the offender’s dignity and autonomy and the dignity of the law to 
impose a punishment on an offender who does not understand what is 
happening.  Perhaps more important, an incompetent offender cannot 
adequately participate in the sentencing process, which may make it more 
difficult for the defense to argue for mitigation, thus reducing the fairness of 
the sentencing process. 
The difficult question is whether the state may involuntarily medicate 
an offender incompetent to be sentenced for the purpose of restoring 
sentencing competence.  Unlike the defendant incompetent to stand trial 
who is presumed innocent, the defendant incompetent to be sentenced has 
been convicted and is lawfully in custody (or is perhaps out on bail, but still 
under criminal justice restraint).  The offender has a clear interest in being 
free of unwanted mind-altering medication, but the government’s interest in 
sentencing a convicted defendant is also strong.  If the offender is a danger 
to himself or others in custody—whether in a jail or a hospital—
Washington v. Harper permits his involuntary medication,181 and he may 
thereby also be restored to competence to be sentenced.   
Suppose, however, that there is no Harper justification?  I would 
permit the state to medicate the offender as long as it was medically 
appropriate and less restrictive alternatives, such as psychosocial therapies, 
were unavailing.  Retaining a psychotic, unsentenced convict in a hospital, 
which is more expensive than a prison, is an unjustified use of resources.  If 
the defendant is on bail and is not dangerous, treatment could be 
 
180 Lower courts have essentially employed the test for competence to be executed 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), which requires 
that the prisoner is able to understand what sentence is being imposed and why.  Some lower 
courts and commentators have also imposed or suggested further requirements.  PARRY, 
supra note 46, at 103–04. 
181 Washington v. Harper, 494. U.S. 210, 225–27 (1990). 
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accomplished in the community on an outpatient basis.  There is systemic 
value in reaching final resolution of questions a case presents. 
If the offender simply cannot be restored or there is otherwise reason 
to avoid involuntary medication, the court could impose a conditional 
sentence and retain the person in a hospital or perhaps in prison if the latter 
can manage the person.  I assume that, as a practical matter, the sentence 
would be the maximum for the crime of conviction.  If there had been a plea 
bargain and sentence was not imposed at the time the plea was made, then 
the sentence would be for the agreed term.  If at any point the convict is 
restored to competence, either by agreeing to take medicine or by 
spontaneous recovery, the court can then impose a final sentence.  If the 
defendant is never restored to sentencing competence, then he would be 
released at the end of the conditional sentence.  I assume that in some cases 
ordinary civil commitment would not be available after the defendant was 
released because he did not present a danger to himself or others.  If he did, 
then he probably would have been medicated according to Harper.  If the 
jurisdiction has a parens patriae commitment standard, such as the need for 
care and treatment or the inability to care for basic needs, then civil 
commitment might apply.182 
B. FORCIBLE MEDICATION AND TRANSFER TO HOSPITAL 
In Harper, the Supreme Court held that prisoners have a liberty 
interest in avoiding unwanted psychotropic medication, but the state’s 
interest in the safety of the prisoner and others would justify forcible 
psychotropic medication if it were medically appropriate and the prisoner 
would otherwise be a danger to himself or others as a result of mental 
disorder.183  I believe that the case is properly decided.  Prisons are a 
particularly difficult environment and interests of institutional and personal 
safety are paramount.  There are a few difficulties, however.  Psychotropic 
medications can be used as instruments of pure social control, which is not 
justified.  This could occur if the prisoner were dangerous and mentally 
disordered, but there was no relation between the two.  Harper criteria 
should explicitly include a connection between the mental disorder and the 
potential for danger.  The second problem is the nature of Harper hearings.  
 
182 See JOHN PARRY, CIVIL MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY: A 
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND MENTAL DISABILITY 
PROFESSIONALS 478–79 (2010) (describing parens patriae criteria); see also CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE, § 5150 (authorizing commitment for people who are “gravely disabled” as a 
result of mental disorder) and § 5008(h)(1)(A) (defining grave disability as a “condition in 
which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic 
personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter”). 
183 Harper, 494 U.S. at 225–29. 
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The Supreme Court approved Washington’s process, which permitted all 
the personnel involved, including the prisoner’s adviser, to be employed by 
the institution.184  This creates an inevitable conflict of interest.  It is 
understandable that these hearings need not be fully adversarial with the full 
panoply of criminal justice procedural protections because this would be 
unduly burdensome for the state.  The prisoner is facing the loss of an 
important liberty right, however, and some independent check on the 
institution should be provided.  There are many ways this might be 
reasonably accomplished without undermining the efficiency of the process, 
such as providing counsel from a public defender’s office or a panel of 
community attorneys, or an independent advisor or mental health 
professional from another institution. 
If a prisoner’s mental disorder renders him unmanageable in the 
prison, Vitek v. Jones185 held that the prisoner can be transferred to a 
hospital after a hearing at which the prisoner has a right to be heard and the 
right to an advisor (although not a lawyer).  The Court recognized that the 
prisoner has an interest in avoiding the stigmatization associated with 
mental hospitalization and the possibility of forcible treatment.  This is a 
sensible decision that reasonably balances individual and governmental 
interests as long as the hearings provide the defendant with a genuine 
chance to contest transferal.  It would be better if the prisoner were 
represented by adversarial counsel rather than by an appointed adviser who 
will typically be a prison employee and therefore subject to conflict of 
interest.  Providing counsel would not be unduly burdensome in this context 
and it would provide greater fairness.  Although Vitek does not compel the 
government to provide adversary counsel, it should do so in the interest of 
justice. 
C. SENTENCING 
The issue in all types of sentencing, capital and non-capital, is the role 
mental disorder should play for both mitigation and aggravation.  
Sentencing schemes vary substantially across the United States, but I shall 
assume for the purpose of argument that the judge has the authority to use 
mental disorder as a sentencing factor.  I should say at the outset that if the 
offender has a colorable mitigation claim based on mental disorder or if the 
prosecution will introduce mental disorder evidence to support 
enhancement, I would provide an independent mental health professional to 
aid the offender with sentencing.  As people with criminal justice 
experience know, for many offenders the length of time that they will spend 
 
184 Id. at 233–36; see also id. at 250–55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
185 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
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in prison is more important than whether they are convicted.  All 
sentencing, not just capital sentencing, is vital to the offender and the 
process will not be fair unless he has the assistance of a mental health 
professional in appropriate cases. 
Let us begin with mitigation.  If the guilty but partially responsible 
mitigation I proposed above were adopted, then the defendant would have 
two chances to have his mental abnormality short of legal insanity 
considered.  If the jury accepted the GPR claim, then there would be no 
need for the judge to consider mental abnormality evidence at sentencing 
because a reduction would be automatic.  For now, however, using mental 
disorder to mitigate will be almost entirely a matter of judicial discretion at 
sentencing. 
In Graham v. Florida,186 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibited imposing sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole (LWOP) on juveniles who committed non-homicide 
crimes because juveniles were less responsible than adults and did not 
deserve such severe sentences even for heinous non-homicide crimes.  The 
Court’s conclusion about diminished responsibility followed its reasoning 
in Atkins,187 which excluded people with retardation from receiving death 
sentences for capital crimes, and in Roper,188 which exempted sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-old capital murderers from capital punishment.  The ground 
for diminished responsibility was essentially that these defendants suffered 
from diminished rationality.189  Graham was the first occasion that the 
Court used a diminished desert rationale based on diminished rationality to 
insist on what is in effect mitigation for a term of years sentence.190 
The reasoning of Graham or the arguments I have made about guilty 
but partially responsible generalize perfectly to using evidence of mental 
 
186 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
187 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
188 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
189 In Graham, the Court explicitly relied on the Roper factors discussed supra at note 
177, and also reemphasized that juveniles were not yet fully mature and might change as 
normal maturation occurred.  Nonetheless, lack of rational capacity was the primary ground.  
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–227. 
190 In Graham, the majority relied on Roper’s conclusion that adolescents are relevantly 
different, but cited amicus briefs for the proposition that the adolescent brain was not yet 
fully mature.  Id. at 2026.  This has produced irrational exuberance among those who want 
courts to take more account of neuroscience evidence.  The Court referred generally to 
neuroscience to support its conclusion that nothing in the science of adolescent development 
in the intervening five years changed the Roper conclusion, but no one had argued to the 
contrary.  Arguments in support of juvenile LWOP in non-homicide cases were based 
entirely on other normative and empirical arguments, and thus, I submit, the neuroscience 
was dictum. 
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disorder at the time of the crime for sentencing mitigation generally.  
Defendants do not deserve mitigation solely because they were disordered, 
but they do deserve it if the disorder impaired the rationality of their 
practical reasoning about the criminal offense.  Such rationality 
impairments can range along a long continuum, however, and thus fine-
grained differences in responsibility are possible in principle.  At present, 
however, we lack the conceptual and moral capacity to respond in a fine-
grained manner and the result will be inevitable, unwitting abuses of 
discretion and unjustified disparities in sentencing.  Principled, finely-
calibrated sentencing is impossible.  In such circumstances, greater justice 
will be done if we recognize the inevitable limitations on fine-grained 
individualization and try to achieve proportionate equality within limited 
bounds. 
In a few cases, mental disorder evidence might also tend to show that 
the defendant is less dangerous because it renders the defendant 
disorganized, ineffective, or the like.  If this were the case, there would be 
grounds for mitigating a sentence on consequential grounds as well.  Again, 
diminished dangerousness would be a continuum, but we lack the empirical 
resources to make such distinctions and predictions accurately. 
My proposal, therefore, is that there should be a legislatively-mandated 
mitigation if the judge finds that substantial diminished rationality existed 
at the time of the crime.  The amount of reduction could be a uniform 
percentage or might vary by crime to adjust for social safety concerns, but 
the sentencing judge would have no power to individualize beyond the 
mandated reduction.  Such one-size-fits-all approaches risk unfair lumping 
and “cliff effects,”191 but the overall effects will be positive.  Most desert 
and danger criteria cannot be reliably measured, but instead require rougher 
retributive judgments and often speculative empirical assessments.  Further, 
given the limits on human judgment and the greater reliability of judgments 
with fewer categories, everyone can understand the need for bright-line 
rules that risk some disparity at the margins.  Less injustice will be 
produced by this approach than the inequality flowing from the unreliability 
of judgments involving more numerous categories. 
Evidence of mental disorder can also be used for enhancement within 
the authorized sentence range if it is a risk factor for future antisocial 
conduct.  For example, substance abuse and psychopathy are both serious 
 
191 I borrow this term from the economic literature on enforcement, which notes that 
equal punishments for crimes of different seriousness produces crimes of greater seriousness.  
See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970). 
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risk factors for future crime.192  Mental abnormality is thus a knife that cuts 
both ways in sentencing.  Although the relevance to both mitigation and 
aggravation is true in theory, the empirical basis for the alternatives of 
mitigation and aggravation is asymmetrical.  Despite the problems with 
mental abnormality evidence, establishing that the defendant had a 
substantial mental abnormality at the time of the crime and therefore 
deserves mitigation is reasonably possible.  It is a very fact-based issue that 
turns on the defendant’s mental states.  Evaluation of such states is a bread 
and butter issue in criminal (and civil) cases.  Predictions are of course 
based on facts, but even if the facts are established, the accuracy of such 
predictions is weak, even if mechanical techniques or semi-structured 
interviews are used.  The level of acceptable accuracy is of course a 
normative question that cannot be “read off” from Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Despite the Supreme Court’s willingness to accept 
admittedly inaccurate predictions in Barefoot,193 one would hope than an 
extremely high level of accuracy would be required before increasing a 
sentence or putting a capital offender to death on the basis of a 
dangerousness prediction. 
After Barefoot, there is no constitutional bar to introducing weak 
prediction evidence, but sentencing enhancements should be rationalized to 
achieve justice.  To the extent one is doing evidence-based sentencing and 
is using reliable and valid diagnostic techniques and adequate databases, 
using mental disorder as a risk factor seems reasonable.  At present, 
mechanical (actuarial) methods and semi-structured interview techniques 
are state of the art and should be required.194  The difficulty is that too many 
claims for enhancement based on predictions do not use the best techniques 
and data despite large improvements in the technology of prediction. 
Our ability to make valid, fine-grained predictions about future danger 
are quite limited at present, so I would limit enhancement to one grade of 
enhancement if the defendant meets a legislatively mandated threshold of 
heightened risk beyond the “average” case at the core of the penalty range.  
I would also require that the sentencing judge should insist that the 
prosecution should demonstrate that the risk evaluation and prediction 
methods it uses are state of the art.  Although the Constitution may require 
 
192 For a discussion of substance abuse, see JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK 
ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 94 tbl.5.1, 141 
(2001).  For psychopathy, see id. at 65–72; Douglas et al., supra note 150, at 534; Widiger, 
supra note 151, at 157–59. 
193 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).  See also notes 127–128, supra. 
194 Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 
20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793193. 
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considerably less, the defendant’s freedom is at stake and justice demands 
that we use the best evidence before depriving it further. 
Capital sentencing, the most extreme form of crime and danger 
prevention, like sentencing generally, raises the issue of the role of mental 
disorder as both a mitigating and aggravating factor.  The considerations are 
similar, but so much more is at stake.  Death is different. 
Beginning in 1978 with Lockett v. Ohio,195 the Supreme Court has 
made clear that the defendant can introduce any potentially mitigating 
evidence at capital sentencing proceedings, whether or not it supports a 
statutorily authorized mitigating factor.  It is universally accepted that 
mental disorder is a mitigating factor, and many jurisdictions specifically 
list mental abnormality as a mitigating factor, using language similar to the 
Model Penal Code’s “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” criterion or 
a similar partial responsibility standard.196  Although only a minority of 
states makes “dangerousness” per se a statutorily aggravating factor, 
dangerousness is incorporated implicitly or explicitly in other listed factors, 
and, as just discussed, purely clinical mental health testimony is used to 
predict future dangerousness, despite the empirical weaknesses of clinical 
predictions. 
There are no constitutional means to exclude abnormality evidence for 
the purposes of mitigation.  The states should nonetheless be free to exclude 
aggravating predictions because they are too inaccurate to be the basis for 
imposing the death penalty, but, as a practical, political matter, I suspect 
that no jurisdiction would do this.  I therefore propose two less “extreme” 
prophylactic measures.  First, the state should require use of the most 
empirically validated prediction methods rather than clinical evaluations or 
responses to hypothetical questions.  As noted previously, mechanical 
(actuarial) methods and semi-structured interview techniques are state of 
the art and should be required.197  Second, the defendant must have access 
to an independent mental health professional to help him prepare mitigation 
evidence and to defend against aggravation evidence of future 
dangerousness.  Of course, if the defendant does not raise mental 
abnormality, then, consistent with Estelle v. Smith,198 a defendant cannot be 
compelled to undergo a psychiatric examination whose results will be used 
at capital sentencing, unless the defendant consents to such use.  In that 
case, the state would have to rely on the answers to hypothetical questions, 
which my proposal would bar. 
 
195 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
196 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
197 Skeem & Monahan, supra note 194, at 39. 
198 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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D. COMPETENCE TO BE EXECUTED AND FORCIBLE RESTORATION OF 
COMPETENCE 
At common law, a prisoner sentenced to death could not be executed if 
he was incompetent because he did not understand what penalty was being 
imposed or why.  The Supreme Court finally held199 and reaffirmed200 that 
the common law practice has constitutional status under the Eighth 
Amendment.  In Ford, the first Supreme Court case to so hold, the Court 
noted that the reasons for this uniform common law rule are less certain and 
uniform than the rule itself.201  The Court then considered a number of 
historical rationales that might support the doctrine, but, in short, the 
rationale is that executing incompetent offenders is simply cruel and that 
society must protect the defendant and protect the dignity of society. 
In Panetti, the Court appeared to adopt a primarily retributive 
rationale, suggesting that the incompetent offender could not recognize the 
gravity of his crime and that executing him would not allow the community 
to affirm its judgment that the prisoner’s culpability was so serious that he 
deserved death.202  The Court therefore rejected a narrow reading of the 
substantive requirements for competence to be executed.  Panetti was 
concededly delusional and the Court held that a reading of the test that 
would permit execution of an offender who simply understood or was 
aware, rather than rationally understood, the fact of execution and why he 
was being executed, was inconsistent with the rationale and language of 
Ford.203  The Court wrote: 
Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a 
link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that 
the punishment can serve no proper purpose.  It is therefore error to derive from Ford, 
and the substantive standard for incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a strict 
test for competency that treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is 
aware the State has identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be 
inflicted.204 
It is clear that, unlike in Godinez, in which the Court rejected an 
allegedly higher “reasoned choice” test for competence to plead guilty and 
to waive counsel,205 in this context a higher standard is required.  Death is 
indeed different. 
 
199 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986). 
200 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007). 
201 Ford, 477 U.S. at 407. 
202 Id. at 958–59. 
203 Id. at 958. 
204 Id. at 960. 
205 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993). 
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For purposes of discussion, we must assume that the defendant was 
competent to be tried, was properly convicted, was competent to be 
sentenced, and was properly sentenced to death.  There is much reason to 
question these assumptions, despite the many procedural protections Justice 
Powell noted in his Ford concurrence.206  It is possible that the offender was 
not suffering from substantial disorder at the earlier stages of the criminal 
process, and only became severely disordered in prison.  Nonetheless, the 
most common age of onset for psychotic ideation of the type that might 
undermine competence, which is usually a symptom of schizophrenia, is in 
late adolescence and young adulthood, although late-onset cases do 
occur.207  Therefore, many people later found incompetent to be executed 
were probably suffering from substantial mental problems at the time of the 
crime and during trial and sentencing—problems that were not sufficiently 
addressed or properly considered.  Consequently, many such offenders 
should not have been sentenced to death in the first place because, at the 
least, mental abnormality should have mitigated punishment at sentencing.  
Again, however, let us assume that the process was sufficiently fair.208 
It is not clear whose interests are being protected by the bar on 
executing incompetent offenders.  Executing incompetent prisoners might 
seem to support individual or state interests we endorse.  For example, a 
prisoner who does not fully apprehend what is happening might be less 
fearful.  The community might be indifferent to the mental state of the 
prisoner at the time of the execution and satisfied both that the defendant 
deserved death for his conduct at the time of the crime and that the state 
must fulfill its obligation to impose that sentence.  Professor Richard 
Bonnie, influenced by Justice Powell, suggests that the only sound rationale 
for this bar is respect for the dignity of the condemned prisoner, who has a 
right to be treated as a subject worthy of respect and not simply as an object 
to vindicate the state’s promise.209  If the offender does not realize what is 
happening to him, he will not be able to exercise the few choices left to him 
that preserve his autonomy, agency and dignity.210  I have been persuaded 
by Professor Bonnie’s argument, but it does leave open precisely how much 
 
206 Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring). 
207 DSM notes that the typical onset of schizophrenia occurs between the late teens and 
mid-thirties, but that late onset is also possible.  DSM, supra note 3, at 307. 
208 I confess that I am deeply ambivalent about the issues in this subpart.  I oppose 
capital punishment and one part of me wants to make any argument possible to abolish it.  
Another part, however, recognizes that it has constitutional status and I therefore try to make 
arguments in light of that status. 
209 Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and 
Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257, 277 (2007). 
210 See id. 
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rational understanding is necessary to vindicate the condemned’s dignity.  
Because death is different, I would insist that a high standard should be 
imposed.  A just society should insure that it substantially increases the risk 
of error in favor of the prisoner. 
In Ford and Panetti, the Court did not hold that the decision about 
competence to be executed must be made by a judge.  Instead, and again 
following Justice Powell’s Ford concurrence,211 it is apparently sufficient if 
there is some type of impartial hearing officer or board that can receive 
arguments and evidence from the prisoner.212  Panetti made clear, however, 
that the offender is entitled to use his own experts to rebut the State’s 
evidence.213   
For a decision of such importance, only a judicial hearing is sufficient 
to protect the prisoner’s rights.  Any other type of decisionmaker, especially 
if it is an individual, will appear less formally rigorous or independent and 
will in fact probably be less rigorous and independent.  Moreover, the 
prisoner should be entitled to the services of a genuinely independent 
mental health practitioner if the prisoner is too poor to hire his own.  As a 
practical matter, anti-capital punishment advocates will surely insure that 
such services are provided, but it ought to be the prisoner’s right. 
Suppose the concededly incompetent capital prisoner could potentially 
be restored to competence by taking medically appropriate psychotropic 
medication, but refuses to do so.  The Supreme Court has not decided this 
issue, but it has reached both a state supreme court, State v. Perry, which 
decided that the prisoner could not be medicated unless the death penalty 
was commuted,214 and a federal circuit court, Singleton v. Norris, which 
held that the state’s interest was sufficiently strong to permit forcible 
medication.215  This is a fearsomely difficult issue.  In contrast to Harper,216 
in this case the prisoner must undergo not only the liberty deprivation of 
forcible medication, which is not insignificant in itself, but also the ultimate 
deprivation of death as a result.  On the other hand, the meaning of a capital 
sentence is that society has decided that the prisoner no longer has a right to 
live.  It is forfeit. 
Singleton held that forcible medication would be permissible if the 
state had a sufficiently strong interest, if the medication was the least 
 
211 477 U.S. 399, 425–27(1986) (Powell, J., concurring). 
212 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949–50 (2007). 
213 Id. at 950, 958 (requiring that the prisoner must be able to offer his own psychiatric 
testimony as a counterweight to the State’s evidence). 
214 610 So. 2d 746, 770 (La. 1992). 
215 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003). 
216 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
2011] MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 949 
intrusive way of restoring competence, and if it was medically 
appropriate.217  Let us assume that the state’s interest in imposing capital 
punishment is strong, as it surely is, and that medication is necessary to 
restore competence, as it will be in most cases.  The issue is how to think 
about whether the medication is medically appropriate.  Therapy of the 
disorder may ameliorate it, but if so, it will enable execution.  As a result, it 
is claimed that it is not in the prisoner’s medical interest to be medicated so 
that he may be killed.218 
With respect, the petitioner’s undoubted interest in continuing his life 
is a moral and legal issue independent of his medical interests.  His medical 
interest is in alleviating serious illness.  His personal interest in remaining 
alive is the same legal interest any citizen has in life, except that in this case 
it is forfeit.  An analogy may help make this clearer.  Suppose the 
condemned prisoner suffers from an illness that can cause loss of contact 
with reality or other dementia-like states and suffering.  Suppose, too, that 
medication to control the disorder can cease to be fully effective unless the 
dosage is increased.  If the prisoner’s illness became uncontrolled as 
execution neared and he lost touch with reality and was suffering, it would 
be medically inappropriate not to treat the defendant.  Or suppose the 
prisoner suffered a stroke and was in coma in the emergency room.  Should 
the doctors fail to treat?  I suggest that all physicians would believe it is 
their duty to treat the prisoner.  These cases can be distinguished, of course, 
but is there a distinction that makes a principled difference or is the desire 
to avoid capital punishment at all costs driving the argument? 
In Washington v. Glucksberg,219 the Court rejected the argument that 
people have a due process right to physician-assisted suicide.  In the course 
of reaching that decision, the Court noted the state’s interest in upholding 
the ethics of the medical profession as one ground for affirming the state’s 
constitutional right to ban this practice.220  Although there was a split in the 
medical profession over the ethics of this practice, the dominant view of the 
medical profession was that it was not ethical.  There did not have to be 
consensus to uphold the state’s right to ban the practice.  I do not know of 
any empirical study of this question, but almost certainly the overwhelming 
majority of American physicians would probably oppose forcible 
psychotropic medication to restore trial competence unless the death 
penalty was commuted.  Surely, however, there are a few physicians who 
do not oppose it and who would administer the medication either because 
 
217 319 F.3d at 1027. 
218 See id. at 1025–27. 
219 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
220 Id. at 731. 
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they do not think it is wrong or because they think it is their distasteful 
duty, but a duty nonetheless if they work for the state.221  In a sense, this 
case is the reverse of Glucksberg.  There, the patient wanted treatment that 
most doctors oppose.222  Here, the prisoner does not want treatment that 
most doctors think it is wrong to impose unless capital punishment is 
commuted.  Nonetheless, the Court might uphold banning forcible 
medication on the ground that permitting it undermines medical ethics.  
And, much as states can authorize physician-assisted suicide, states will 
certainly have the right to ban the practice of forcible medication to restore 
execution competence, even if the Supreme Court ultimately decides that 
the Constitution does not absolutely prohibit it. 
If the Supreme Court does permit this practice, a particularly difficult 
question is whether, when an execution date is set, competence flowing 
from medication justified by Harper223 should be sufficient to let execution 
proceed.  This would permit the state to avoid the harder issue presented by 
using forcible medication solely to restore competence to be executed.  The 
prisoner may continue to be a threat to his own safety or the safety of 
others.  Nonetheless, the prisoner on death row can probably be managed 
without medication because the circumstances are very different from those 
of prisoners in the general population.  I propose that as the execution date 
approaches, the medication should be reduced or withdrawn to determine if 
the prisoner is rendered incompetent to be executed.  If so, then the state 
must confront directly whether it is willing to medicate this prisoner solely 
for the purpose of executing him.  I want the state to be forced to decide this 
rather than to be permitted to comfort itself with an independent rationale 
that is much less problematic.  It is not enough to demonstrate that the 
Harper medication is genuinely independently motivated and justified and 
that competence restoration is simply a side benefit.  It might be argued that 
because the prisoner’s life is already forfeit, society owes no such 
obligation to set up potential roadblocks that compel the state to clear-
sighted recognition of the immensity of its proposed action.  Perhaps so, but 
a civilized society should demand this. 
In conclusion, resolving in general and in individual cases the 
immensely difficult issues presented by incompetence to be executed is 
another one of the many costs and controversies capital punishment 
produces that abolition would avoid. 
 
221 A state could surely permit an employee without a medical degree but with the proper 
training to administer the drugs. 
222 521 U.S. at 710. 
223 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
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VI. PREVENTIVE DETENTION THROUGH CIVIL COMMITMENT 
This Part considers two forms of post-trial civil commitment that are 
triggered by the criminal justice system and by mental abnormality: 
involuntary commitment of so-called mentally abnormal sexually violent 
predators and involuntary commitment of defendants who were acquitted 
by reason of insanity.  I conclude that sexual predator commitments are an 
abuse because they are based on a flawed definition of mental abnormality 
and flawed lack of control criterion and because they are a disguised form 
of punishment.  Post-insanity acquittal commitment is sensible, but it is 
often misused. 
A. SEXUAL PREDATOR COMMITMENT 
A substantial minority of states have adopted a special form of 
involuntary civil commitment if three criteria are met: a charge or 
conviction of a sexual offense, the presence of a mental abnormality or a 
personality disorder, and predicted future dangerousness.  Although civil, 
these forms of commitment are usually accorded heightened procedural due 
process by legislation, such as the necessity of proving the criteria beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  They may be imposed at the end of a full prison term for 
the sexual crime of conviction, and the term of confinement is indefinite but 
includes periodic review. 
In Kansas v. Hendricks,224 the Supreme Court upheld this type of 
commitment against a claim that it violated substantive due process.  The 
Court noted that the requirement of a mental abnormality satisfied a classic 
due process justification for civil commitment because it indicated that the 
subject could not control his offending sexual behavior.225  Thus, for this 
and other reasons, the Court held that the commitment was genuinely civil 
and not criminal punishment.226 
Just five years later, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court again addressed the 
criteria for these commitments to decide whether the justifying rationale of 
lack of control had to be proven independently.227  The Court held that it 
did, noting that the presence of a mental abnormality did not have to render 
the defendant completely unable to control his conduct.228  Justice Breyer 
wrote for the majority: 
 
224 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
225 Id. at 360. 
226 Id. at 365–66.  The statutes provide that these commitments may be triggered simply 
by a charge of a sexual offense or incompetence to stand trial for such an offense, but in 
practice they are imposed post-conviction and sentence. 
227 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
228 Id. at 411–12. 
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[W]e did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly narrow or technical 
meaning.  And we recognized that in cases where lack of control is at issue, “inability 
to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision.  It is 
enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.  
And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the 
psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be 
sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but 
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.229 
The Court also refused to draw a distinction control capacity flowing 
from failures of understanding rather than simply “volitional” failures.  
Justice Breyer wrote, “Nor, when considering civil commitment, have we 
ordinarily distinguished for constitutional purposes among volitional, 
emotional, and cognitive impairments.”230  It is implicit in the Court’s 
holding that satisfying the Hendricks criteria, including the mental 
abnormality criteria, did not mean that the defendant lacked the necessary 
control capacity because otherwise it would not have been necessary to 
impose an independent control criterion.231 
Sexual predators fall into the gap between criminal and civil 
confinement that desert-disease jurisprudence creates.  Sexual offenders are 
routinely held fully responsible and blameworthy for their behavior because 
they almost always retain substantial capacity for rationality, they remain 
entirely in touch with reality, and they know the applicable moral and legal 
rules.  Consequently, even if their sexual violence is in part caused by a 
mental abnormality, they do not meet the usual standards for an insanity 
defense.232  For the same reason, they do not meet the usual and implicit 
non-responsibility standards for civil commitment and could not be 
restrained civilly after they finish a prison term.233  In other words, their 
 
229 Id. at 413. 
230 Id. at 415. 
231 In dissent, Justice Scalia claimed that Hendricks necessarily meant that lack of control 
was implicit in the mental abnormality standard because Hendricks’s commitment was 
upheld.  Id. at 422–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
232 Consider the remarks of Justice Owen Dixon of Australia in King v. Porter: 
[A] great number of people who come into a Criminal Court are abnormal.  They would not be 
there if they were the normal type of average everyday people.  Many of them are very peculiar 
in their dispositions and peculiarly tempered.  That is markedly the case in sexual offenes [sic]. 
Nevertheless, they are mentally quite able to appreciate what they are doing and quite able to 
appreciate the threatened punishment of the law and the wrongness of their acts, and they are 
held in check by the prospect of punishment. 
(1933) 55 CLR 182, 187 (Austl.). 
233 The implicit non-responsibility standard is the lack of rational (or control) capacity.  
See supra subpart II.B (discussing the general rationale for treating people with mental 
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rationality and control capacities do not indicate that they are sufficiently 
non-responsible to justify the preventive detention involuntary civil 
commitment imposes.  Moreover, in most cases in which civil commitment 
is justified, a majority of states no longer maintain routine indefinite 
involuntary civil commitment but instead tend to limit the permissible 
length of commitment.234  Without these special forms of commitment, 
most “sexual predators” could not be preventively detained unless they 
committed a new crime. 
I have frequently and severely criticized the statutes authorizing 
allegedly civil commitment for sexual predators and both Hendricks and 
Crane.235  My argument is that the gap-filling is impermissible because the 
mental abnormality criterion the Court approved is not a definition of 
abnormality and the control criterion is vague and not operationalizable. 
Together these two criteria do not entail that the agent is non-responsible.  
The differential responsibility requirement for criminal conviction and civil 
sexual predator commitment is unjustified, and adequate prediction does 
not exist.  Let us consider these problems in order. 
The Kansas definition of a sexually violent predator, which is similar 
to those that other states have adopted, is “any person who has been 
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers 
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person 
likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.”236  It is analytic from this 
definition and the Hendricks and Crane decisions that personality disorder 
or mental abnormality and serious control difficulty are the criteria that 
together satisfy the non-responsibility condition.237  Unless personality 
disorder or mental abnormality produce or are the equivalent of non-
responsibility because they somehow deprive the agent of the ability to 
control himself, the non-responsibility justification of involuntary 
commitment is not satisfied.  Just because behavior is caused, even by an 
alleged abnormality, does not mean per se that it cannot be controlled or 
that the person is otherwise not responsible.  This must be independently 
demonstrated.238 
 
disorder specially).  Moreover, professionals do not prefer to treat dangerous people who are 
not obviously suffering from a major disorder. 
234 See note 58, supra. 
235 E.g., Morse, supra note 20; Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from 
Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 250 (1998). 
236 KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-29a02(a) (West 2010). 
237 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–
11 (2002). 
238 See supra subpart II.C and notes 145–46. 
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“Personality disorder” is a recognized category of psychiatric 
diagnoses, but people with personality disorders rarely suffer on that basis 
alone from the types of psychotic cognition or extremely severe mood 
problems that are the standard touchstones for a finding of non-
responsibility.239  Most are perfectly in touch with reality, their instrumental 
rationality is intact, and they have adequate knowledge of the applicable 
moral and legal rules that apply to their conduct.240  Although their 
abnormalities might make it harder for them to behave well, they seldom 
manifest the grave problems that might satisfy an insanity defense or even 
warrant a commonsense excuse on the ground that the person cannot “help” 
himself.  Even if the term “personality disorder” were interpreted broadly to 
include paraphilias, disorders of impulse control, or other recognized 
disorders that might apply to sexual predators, the term would still be over-
inclusive as a predicate for non-responsibility in the case of most sexually 
violent people. 
The “mental abnormality” criterion the Court approved241 is defined as 
a “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional 
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses 
in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of 
others.”242  All nine Justices approved this definition as an adequate basis 
for these commitments.243  The meaning of “emotional” and “volitional” is 
unclear.244  But holding that and any consideration of cognitive abilities 
aside, what else would predispose any agent to any conduct—sexual or 
 
239 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 685–86. 
240 Examination of the criteria for personality disorders in DSM-IV confirms that 
sufferers experience no substantial rationality deficits akin to those with psychotic disorders. 
 In many cases, the conduct that is the basis for the diagnosis does not per se cause the 
person distress.  For example, an agent whose conduct warrants the diagnosis of Antisocial 
Personality Disorder may be distressed by the reactions of the police, creditors, and others, 
but the conduct itself might not be distressing.  Similarly, many sexually violent predators 
are not distressed by their desires, but they are distressed by the condemnation and 
punishment that society and the law impose.  Moreover, the degree of distress or impairment 
such disorders cause is very much a function of the particular social, moral, and legal regime 
in which the person lives, which once again suggests the highly value-relative nature of the 
judgment of disorder in these cases.  
241 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360. 
242 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (2010). 
243 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (majority opinion), 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 373–74 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
244 The meaning of volition is controversial in philosophy and psychology.  See MICHAEL 
S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CRIMINAL LAW 113–65 (2d ed. 2010) (providing the most extensive discussion of volition in 
the legal literature, criticizing the view that volitions are desires, and arguing that a volition 
is an intention to execute a basic action). 
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otherwise, normal or abnormal—if not biological and environmental 
variables that affect the agent’s emotional and volitional ability?  In other 
words, the definition is simply a partial, generic description of the causation 
of all behavior, and it is not a limiting definition of abnormality.  All 
behavior is (partially) caused by emotional and volitional abilities that have 
themselves been caused by congenital and acquired characteristics.  The 
conditions that makes sexual predation mentally abnormal—congenital or 
acquired causes of a predisposition—apply to all behavior and are thus, 
vacuous.  The mental abnormality criterion certainly cannot explain why 
the inevitable presence of congenital and acquired causes of a 
predisposition means that the agent cannot control and is not responsible for 
action that expresses the predisposition.  Indeed, according to this criterion, 
no one would ever be responsible for any conduct. 
The Kansas criterion is entirely dependent on the requirement of a 
specific predisposition to commit sexually violent offenses to limit the 
definition to sexual predators, but it is not a definition of mental 
abnormality, even in the case of sexually violent people.245  If any agent 
who has a predisposition to commit sexual offenses is mentally abnormal, 
as the definition implies, then the definition of mental abnormality is 
circular, and abnormality does not independently provide even part of the 
necessary explanation of how the abnormality produces an uncontrollable 
predisposition to sexual offending.  The definition presupposes what it is 
trying to explain.  Moreover, such a circular definition collapses the 
important distinction between “badness” and “madness,” which is precisely 
the distinction the definition is meant to achieve to justify civil rather than 
criminal commitment. 
In sum, the criteria in the Kansas statute that help establish non-
responsibility, personality disorder, and mental abnormality, are  over-
inclusive, and the definition of mental abnormality is both obscure and 
virtually incoherent.  The causal link standard in general and the Kansas 
criteria in particular are not non-responsibility standards.  They cannot 
conceivably limit involuntary civil commitment only to those potential 
predators who cannot control themselves and are, thus, not responsible for 
their potential sexual violence.  Using such criteria, virtually every predator 
would be both convictable and committable. 
In Crane Justice Breyer attempted to remedy this difficulty by 
imposing an independent control incapacity criterion, but this does not 
rescue the validity of these commitments.246  Personality disorder and 
mental abnormality do not imply that the agent is non-responsible or has 
 
245 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59–29a02. 
246 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002). 
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serious difficulty controlling himself.  Now, one could permit serious 
difficulty controlling oneself to be a purely independent non-responsibility 
criterion untethered from any requirement that the defendant be disordered 
in some psychological or psychiatric sense.  There is much to be said for 
functional non-responsibility standards.  For example, suppose a defendant 
does not know right from wrong or the nature and quality of his act at the 
time of the crime, through no fault of his own for some reason other than 
mental disorder, say, extreme stress or fatigue.  Perhaps the defendant 
deserves an excuse.  Such claims are rejected, however, because mental 
disorder allegedly provides an objective indicator that makes the functional 
claim credible. 
Even if one accepted independent, functional non-responsibility 
criteria, however, serious control difficulty still fares poorly as a non-
responsibility standard because it is so poorly understood and cannot be 
operationalized adequately.  This standard is an invitation for conclusory, 
morally-grounded expert opinions offered as if they were based on sound 
scientific or clinical standards and measurements, but they are not.  Justice 
Breyer’s suggestion that considering the nature of the diagnosis or the 
severity of the disorder will not help if the abnormality has no meaning and 
if there is no necessary relation between these factors and lack of control.247  
Once again, lack of control must be proved independently. 
The criminal justice system is the appropriate mechanism for control 
of responsible predators.  Agents who are not responsible for their 
predatory sexual violence may properly be confined involuntarily, but such 
a massive deprivation of liberty should be inflicted only on those predators 
who are genuinely not responsible.  Even if a state seems to impose a 
genuinely independent, serious lack of control problem criterion, as Crane 
requires, the definition of such a problem is so inevitably amorphous that 
this criterion will impose no practical limit on abnormal sexual predator 
commitments.248  Mental health professionals will have no difficulty 
 
247 Id. at 413. 
248 In his dissent in Crane, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for the vagueness of the 
control standard it adopted.  He conceded that the mental abnormality or personality disorder 
criterion and the resulting propensity for violence criterion were both coherent and, with the 
assistance of expert testimony, within the capacity of a normal jury to determine.  But he 
chided the majority’s control standard as being so vague that it will give trial judges “not a 
clue” about how to charge juries.  Id. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He speculated that the 
majority offered no further elaboration because “elaboration . . . which passes the laugh test 
is impossible.”  Id.  Justice Scalia wondered whether the test was a quantitative measure of 
loss-of-control capacity or of how frequently the inability to control arises.  In the 
alternative, he questioned whether the standard was “adverbial,” a descriptive 
characterization of the inability to control one’s penchant for sexual violence.  Id. at 424.  
The adverbs he used as examples were “appreciably,” “moderately,” “substantially,” and 
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adjusting their expert testimony to support the conclusion that virtually any 
sexually violent offender meets the serious lack of control standard.  
Moreover, there is nothing in the language of Hendricks and Crane that 
would permit an appellate judge to overturn a jury verdict of serious loss of 
control, except, perhaps, in extreme, obvious cases.249  Loss of control as an 
independent non-responsibility condition simply will not suffice on 
conceptual, scientific, and practical grounds. 
Note that the standards for non-responsibility differ in the criminal and 
civil justice systems because the sexual predator is responsible for his 
sexual crimes but sufficiently non-responsible to warrant involuntary 
commitment based on the same behavior.  It is paradoxical, to say the least, 
to claim that a sexually violent predator is sufficiently responsible to 
deserve the stigma and punishment of criminal incarceration, but that the 
predator is not sufficiently responsible to be permitted the usual freedom 
from involuntary civil commitment that even very predictably dangerous 
but responsible agents retain because we wish to maximize the liberty and 
dignity of all citizens.  But Leroy Hendricks and Michael Crane had no 
realistic chance of succeeding with an insanity defense.  Even if the 
standards for responsibility in the two systems need not be symmetrical, it 
is difficult to imagine what adequate conception of justice would justify 
blaming and punishing an agent too irresponsible to be left at large.  An 
agent responsible enough to warrant criminal punishment is sufficiently 
responsible to avoid preventive detention. If a state seriously believes that 
any mental disability sufficiently compromises responsibility to warrant 
civil preventive detention, then such disability should be part of the criteria 
for the insanity defense.  When a defendant is charged with an offense, it is 
an occasion when the citizen has the most to lose and therefore deserves the 
most consideration. 
Finally, we have previously considered the difficulties with predictive 
accuracy concerning future behavior.  There are mechanical techniques for 
evaluating the risk of future sexual predation, but none has better than 
modest success250 and clinical predictions, which will be used all too often, 
 
“almost totally.”  Id.  According to Justice Scalia, none of these could provide any guidance.  
He was correct. 
249 Such cases would probably be marked by an alleged predator’s history that is entirely 
inconsistent with a colloquial control problem and by patently deficient expert testimony.  I 
assume, however, that such cases would be rare, especially if there were a history of sexual 
predation. 
250 See Dana Anderson & R. Karl Hanson, Static-99: An Actuarial Tool to Assess Risk of 
Sexual and Violent Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK 
ASSESSMENT 251, 255–260, 262 (Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010) (reviewing 
the most widely used sexual recidivism instrument and finding an average “medium to 
large” effect size by conventional standards, but noting that absolute recidivism rates are 
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are notoriously unreliable.251  A sexual predator commitment is potentially 
for life.  The context in which the prediction will be made is a maximum 
security institution in which the subject has been incarcerated: first prison 
and then a secure hospital.  The context of validation is the community.  It 
will be difficult to predict community behavior accurately based on 
behavior in maximum security.  Moreover, gatekeepers, including the state 
mental health professionals who evaluate the alleged predator, will have a 
natural incentive to be conservative.  The subjects are sexual criminals and 
thus not sympathetic people.  It will seem better, and safer, from the 
evaluator’s career standpoint, to err on the side of caution than to err by 
releasing someone who may commit a heinous crime.  Although Ake does 
not require the provision of a mental health professional in the civil 
context,252 the state should provide the potential subject of a sexual predator 
commitment with an independent expert to help him defeat the State’s case. 
Constitutional limitations on the state’s power to confine citizens 
based on our concern for liberty inevitably mean that the protection of 
social safety cannot be seamless and that security will be compromised.  
Some dangerous but responsible agents must remain free until they commit 
a crime or until they become non-responsible for their potential danger.  As 
a result, our justifiable, appropriate fear of the harms such people may cause 
creates strong incentives to devise means to confine them preventively.  
Pure preventive detention on grounds of dangerousness alone is an 
anathema in a free society, however, and we should not loosen the 
standards of non-responsibility to sweep into civil confinement responsible 
agents who should more appropriately be incapacitated by criminal 
sentences.  As Justice Anthony Kennedy warned in his concurrence in 
Hendricks, and as all the Justices in Crane apparently agreed, civil 
commitment should not be used to impose punishment or to avoid the 
effects of deficiencies in the criminal justice system, such as improvident 
plea bargains, which might cause the legally required but objectionably 
early release of dangerous criminals.253  I believe, however, that this is 
precisely the motivation for sexual predator commitments.  They are a way 
 
unknown and that there is large variability in the effect size among the studies, and 
recommending caution in cases in which accurate probability estimates are needed). 
251 See Skeem & Monahan, supra note 194. 
252 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (applying the right to the assistance of a mental 
health professional in the criminal justice process). 
253 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 
(1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Indeed, Crane himself was sentenced to a relatively brief 
term of imprisonment as a result of a plea bargain under circumstances that might otherwise 
have justified a prison term of thirty-five years to life.  In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 
2000). 
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of filling the desert-disease gap using punishment by other means and they 
should be abolished. 
States could, of course, achieve essentially indefinite confinement 
through the criminal justice system by imposing life sentences on sexual 
offenders.  Almost certainly, there would be no constitutional objection 
under current proportionality jurisprudence,254 and many would accept that 
such sentences would be deserved.  Thus, perhaps we should not worry 
about the potentially extensive reach of various control criteria for the civil 
commitment of sexual predators because sexually violent offenders will 
remain incarcerated for very long periods in any case.  But this would be an 
unacceptably skeptical, consequential approach to the danger sexual 
predation presents.255  The law sets moral standards and should be clear 
about which agents are responsible.  Moreover, if sexual dangerousness 
were treated virtually exclusively within the criminal justice system, 
legislators would be forced to confront and to defend the sentences they are 
willing to impose on sexual offenders, rather than sweeping this morally 
fraught question under the psychiatric rug.  Finally, prosecutors would be 
forced to straightforwardly evaluate the strength of their cases and would 
not be able to rely on allegedly civil commitment to remedy the effects of 
weak cases or improvident plea bargains. 
I do not know why our society is apparently more comfortable with the 
combination of limited sentences and sexual predator commitments than 
with lengthier prison terms to protect society from sexual offenders.  A 
positive reason might be that we do not want to impose unnecessarily 
lengthy terms on sex offenders who might not be at great recidivism risk 
and we use the predator commitments as a safety valve for those who are at 
great risk.  I suspect, however, that the real difficulty is that we cannot 
realistically impose draconian sentences on all sexual offenders for various 
reasons, including the weaknesses of prosecution evidence, the need for 
plea bargains and fiscal constraints generally.  Again, the safety valve 
seems necessary, but it is a hidden but clear substitute for insufficient 
punishment.  
 
254 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
contains only a narrow proportionality principle applied to term-of-years sentences). 
255 This objection also bears a stunning resemblance to past claims that the insanity 
defense should be abolished because defendants acquitted by reason of insanity are 
incarcerated in any case.  See Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the “Insanity 
Defense”—Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 864–70 (1963).  These claims were misguided for 
the same reasons that it is important to distinguish responsible from non-responsible sexual 
predators. 
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B. COMMITMENT AFTER ACQUITTAL BY REASON OF LEGAL INSANITY 
In all jurisdictions, a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may be 
automatically civilly committed, either for an evaluation that will be 
followed by formal civil commitment, or by formal commitment itself 
without a prior evaluation.256  Although not punishment for crime—the 
defendant has been acquitted after all—these civil commitments have been 
justified because the defendant is allegedly still dangerous and not 
responsible for the dangerousness.  The terms of such possible 
commitments vary across jurisdictions, but in some jurisdictions the term 
may be indefinite with periodic review.  In Jones v. United States,257 the 
Supreme Court upheld both an automatic commitment for evaluation and 
the potentially indefinite commitment of a defendant acquitted by reason of 
insanity for shoplifting a leather jacket.  The Court argued that, based on an 
insanity acquittal, it is rational to presume that the subject was still mentally 
disordered and dangerous.258  The Court was unwilling to equate 
“dangerousness” with violence.  It claimed that the legislative purpose to 
confine was the same for violent and nonviolent offenses and that the 
former often led to the latter.259  Moreover, for this type of commitment, the 
Court was willing to accept a lesser burden of persuasion than the 
constitutionally-imposed standard civil commitment standard of clear and 
convincing evidence.260  Post-insanity commitments are different, the Court 
claimed, because the defendant himself raised the issue of mental disorder, 
and so the risk of error is decreased.261  Finally, the Court approved 
potentially indefinite confinement on the ground that such confinement did 
bear a rational relation to the purpose of the commitment, which is to 
confine dangerous, non-responsible agents.  The defendant was acquitted so 
the length of the confinement need not be limited by the deserved 
punishment.  The subject is properly confined as long the defendant 
remains disordered and dangerous and need not be released until either 
condition is no longer met.  This might happen at any time, or never.262  In 
Foucha v. Louisiana,263 the Court affirmed that a post-insanity commitment 
 
256 See Parry, supra note 46, at 168–70. 
257 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
258 Id. at 365. 
259 See id. at 365 n.14. 
260 Id. at 367–68; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979). 
261 Jones, 463 U.S. at 367. 
262 Id. at 368–69. 
263 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
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must end if the subject is no longer mentally ill, even if he is still 
dangerous.264 
I think that the Court was correct to decouple the potential length of 
the civil commitment from the sentence for the crime charged.  The 
defendant has been acquitted and the usual justifications for a sentence 
length do not apply.  Roughly, the legislature sets sentences that are 
proportionate to culpability and that reflect an ordinary, rational offender’s 
dangerousness.  The insanity acquittee is neither culpable nor dangerous in 
the ordinary manner, however.  If the basis for the commitment is non-
responsible dangerousness, the commitment can justifiably continue until 
these conditions are no longer met.  Although this is true as a theoretical 
matter, it seems useless to have lengthy commitments for non-violent 
offenders.  They do not present much danger and the risk that they will be 
erroneously held longer than necessary is substantial.  I would have limited 
terms of confinement for non-violent acquittees.  These could be longer 
than ordinary involuntary civil commitment terms because the acquittee 
 
264 Id. at 81.  Justice O’Connor partially concurred.  She noted that an insanity acquittee 
had been found to have committed the prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt.  She then 
wrote cryptically, as follows: 
It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained 
sanity [sic] if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention were tailored 
to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee’s continuing 
dangerousness . . . .   [A]cquittees could not be confined as mental patients absent some medical 
justification for doing so; in such a case the necessary connection between the nature and 
purposes of confinement would be absent. 
Id. at 87–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor also noted that the seriousness of 
the crime should also affect whether the state’s interest in continued confinement would be 
strong enough.  See id. at 88. 
 If the subject is no longer mentally disordered and therefore no longer non-responsible, it 
is hard to imagine what possible “medical justification” there could be for continuing civil 
commitment to protect the public.  It is not clear from the O’Connor concurrence if she 
would require some finding of mental abnormality, as did the statute upheld in Kansas v. 
Hendricks, to make the commitment analogous to traditional civil commitment.  521 U.S. 
346, 355 (1997).  If not, however, then five Justices of the Supreme Court, the four Foucha 
dissenters and Justice O’Connor, would have been willing to countenance pure preventive 
detention, at least of a person who had committed a crime without being responsible and 
who continued to be dangerous. 
 For an attempt to apply Justice O’Connor’s suggestion, see State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 
94, 109 (Wis. 1995) (permitting continued confinement if there were a medical justification 
and the subject was still dangerous, but limiting the term to the maximum sentence for the 
crime charged).  Needless to say, I believe that this practice is simply criminal punishment 
by other means.  The “medical justification” criterion is a transparent and fraudulent attempt 
to bring this type of commitment within the disease justification for preemptive confinement. 
The limitation on the term of the commitment to the maximum term for the crime charged is 
simply a salve to the legislative conscience and a signal that the continued commitment is 
punitive. 
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was prima facie guilty of a criminal offense, which is seldom the case in 
involuntary civil commitment and never required.265  Nonetheless, the terms 
of post-insanity commitment for non-violent offenders should be short.  If 
the subject has a clean disciplinary record in the hospital, he should be 
released at the end of the short term or the state can seek ordinary 
involuntary civil commitment.  Another possibility is conditional or 
probationary release.266  If the acquittee has an unproblematic probationary 
period in the community, the commitment should end. 
The Court in Jones never noted that the mental disorder and 
dangerousness had to be linked to insure that the subject was not 
responsible for his dangerousness.267  After all, non-responsibility for the 
legally relevant behavior, in this case dangerousness, is necessary to justify 
involuntary commitment.  It is possible for a person to be independently 
crazy and bad, with no link between them that suggests that the defendant’s 
dangerousness is irrational.  For example, a defendant may be wildly 
jealous because he delusionally believes that his partner has been unfaithful 
and might have an excuse if he attacked the partner, but there will be no 
excuse if he robs a bank.268  There probably will be such a link in most 
cases of insanity acquittal, but it cannot be taken for granted empirically. 
More important, there is reason to doubt the Court’s presumption of 
continuing mental disorder and dangerousness.  By definition, the defendant 
must have been sufficiently rational to be competent to stand trial.  If that 
state of rational capacity continues, then it is not clear that he continues to 
be mentally ill for the purpose of involuntary commitment.  Moreover, to 
 
265 See PARRY, supra note 182, at 476–77 (discussing the criteria for commitments for 
dangerousness, which do not include a finding of prima facie guilt for a criminal offense or 
the equivalent thereof).  Parry notes that the trend in standard involuntary civil commitments 
for dangerousness is away from requiring overt, recent acts and threats and towards more 
purely predictive criteria.  In practice, however, commitment is common for threatening 
behavior, including verbal threats.  Less serious assaults and thefts may also lead to civil 
commitment, although they are often processed through the criminal justice system.  In my 
experience, seriously violent conduct is virtually always processed through the criminal 
justice system.  Moreover, traditional civil commitment requires only the lower, clear and 
convincing burden of persuasion. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979). 
266 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e)–(f) (West 2010). 
267 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–65 (1983) (discussing the need for a 
showing of both mental disorder and dangerousness to justify these commitments and 
apparently assuming that the fact of an insanity acquittal supplies a link between the two 
criteria, but not explicitly requiring the causal link at the time of commitment). 
268 I recognize that a narrow interpretation of the standards for legal insanity would not 
excuse the person because he would neither be justified nor excused if the facts were as he 
believed them to be.  On a broader reading, however, the defendant is not a rational agent 
and might have a plausible claim for legal insanity.  See supra note 144 and accompanying 
text. 
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the extent that the mental disorder played a causal role in the practical 
reasoning that accompanied the offense, it is perfectly possible that the 
defendant is no longer dangerous either.  This will be especially possible if 
the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion on legal insanity and the 
defendant only needs to cast a reasonable doubt about his sanity.  Even if 
the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, as is commonly the case at 
present, the considerations just adduced apply. 
My suggestion, therefore, is that all post-acquittal commitments should 
be for evaluation only and should not be for full commitment. There is little 
need to deprive the defendant of more liberty to protect the public.  
Preventive commitment should occur only if the evaluation indicates that 
the criteria for commitment are met at present.  The evaluations need not 
last more than a few weeks.  That is more than sufficient for the state’s 
mental health professionals to reach a conclusion.  I once again think that a 
subject facing potentially indefinite commitment and those facing 
substantial limited terms should be entitled to the services of an 
independent mental health professional to help defend against the 
commitment.  Without such help, they have essentially no chance if the 
state’s professional recommends commitment.  These forms of commitment 
are more onerous than ordinary involuntary commitment and fairness 
requires that insanity acquittees should have a chance to avoid long-term 
incarceration in secure forensic facilities.  For the same reason, the State 
should have to prove the commitment criteria by the higher, clear and 
convincing standard that Addington imposed for ordinary involuntary 
commitment to avoid imposing too much risk of error on the individual.269 
VII. THE RADICAL CLAIM THAT WE ARE NOT AGENTS 
In the criminal justice system, mental disorder is typically used as a 
criterion to pick out those agents who should be treated specially because 
they are not responsible or competent in some criminal law context.  This 
Part of the Article briefly addresses the radical claim and hope (of some) 
that neuroscience will cause a paradigm shift in criminal responsibility by 
demonstrating that we are “merely victims of neuronal circumstances”270 or 
some similar claim that denies human agency altogether.  This claim is not 
specifically about the relation of mental disorder to criminal law, but it 
would nevertheless destroy all mental disorder criteria because it essentially 
holds that there is no moral difference between practical reasoning affected 
by mental disorder and ordinary, reasonably rational practical reasoning.  
 
269 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–33. 
270 Greene & Cohen, supra note 41, at 218. 
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Further, it would arguably lead to a pure prediction/prevention system of 
social control unmoored from considerations of responsibility and desert. 
At present, the law’s “official” position—that conscious, intentional, 
rational, and uncompelled agents may properly be held responsible—is 
justified unless and until neuroscience or any other discipline demonstrates 
convincingly that humans are not the type of creatures that we think we are.  
The law’s implicit theory of action presupposes that its subject is an agent 
who acts based on his or her mental states, such as desires, beliefs, and 
intentions.271  Agents are praised and blamed, rewarded and punished.  
Because it is an agent who acts, it makes sense to ask that person to give an 
account of his or her behavior and to be held accountable.  Asking a 
creature or a mechanistic force that does not act to answer to charges does 
not make sense.  If humans are not intentional creatures who act for reasons 
and whose mental states play a causal role in their behavior, then the 
foundational facts for responsibility ascriptions are mistaken.  If it is true 
that we are all automata, then no one is an agent and no one can be 
responsible.  If the concept of mental causation that underlies folk 
psychology and current conceptions of responsibility is false, our 
responsibility practices, and many others, would appear unjustifiable.  Why 
not move, then, to a system of pure preventive detention for dangerous 
agents and perhaps to mandated early detection and intervention for those 
who will become dangerous later? 
This claim is not a strawman.  Here is a lengthy quote from a widely-
noticed article by neuroscientists Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen that 
expresses the mechanistic conception. 
[A]s more and more scientific facts come in, providing increasingly vivid illustrations 
of what the human mind is really like, more and more people will develop moral 
intuitions that are at odds with our current social practices . . . .  Neuroscience has a 
special role to play in this process for the following reason.  As long as the mind 
remains a black box, there will always be a donkey on which to pin dualist and 
libertarian intuitions . . . .  What neuroscience does, and will continue to do at an 
accelerated pace, is elucidate the ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ of the mechanical 
processes that cause behaviour.  It is one thing to deny that human decision-making is 
purely mechanical when your opponent offers only a general, philosophical argument.  
It is quite another to hold your ground when your opponent can make detailed 
predictions about how these mechanical processes work, complete with images of the 
brain structures involved and equations that describe their function . . . .  At some 
further point . . . [p]eople may grow up completely used to the idea that every decision 
is a thoroughly mechanical process, the outcome of which is completely determined 
by the results of prior mechanical processes.  What will such people think as they sit 
 
271 Morse, supra note 29, at 529–33.  See generally ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION 
AND REASON 109–78 (1993) (providing an account of practical reason); Sifferd, supra note 
38. 
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in their jury boxes? . . .  Will jurors of the future wonder whether the defendant . . . 
could have done otherwise?  Whether he really deserves to be punished . . . ?  We 
submit that these questions, which seem so important today, will lose their grip in an 
age when the mechanical nature of human decision-making is fully appreciated.  The 
law will continue to punish misdeeds, as it must for practical reasons, but the idea of 
distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty from those who are merely victims of neuronal 
circumstances will, we submit, seem pointless.272 
Greene and Cohen are not alone among thoughtful people in making 
such claims.  The seriousness of science’s potential challenge to the 
traditional foundations of law and morality is best summed up in the title of 
an eminent psychologist’s recent book, The Illusion of Conscious Will.273 
If our mental states play no role in our behavior and are simply 
epiphenomenal, then traditional notions of responsibility based on mental 
states and on actions guided by mental states would be imperiled.  But is the 
rich explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply a post hoc 
rationalization that the brains of hapless homo sapiens construct to explain 
what their brains have already done?  Will the criminal justice system as we 
know it wither away as an outmoded relic of a prescientific and cruel age?  
If so, not only criminal law is in peril.  What will be the fate of contracts, 
for example, when a biological machine that was formerly called a person 
claims that it should not be bound because it did not make a contract?  The 
contract is also simply the outcome of various “neuronal circumstances.”  
The philosophical view called “compatibilism”—the view that 
responsibility is compatible with the truth of determinism—will not save us 
from this challenge because compatibilism presupposes that we are agents, 
a view the radical challenge denies.274 
Given how little we know about the brain–mind–action connections,275 
to claim based on neuroscience that we should radically change our picture 
 
272 Greene & Cohen, supra note 41, at 217–18 (internal citation omitted). 
273 DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2002); see also Daniel M. 
Wegner, Précis of the Illusion of Conscious Will, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 649 (2004).  The 
précis is followed by open peer commentaries and a response from Professor Wegner.  Id. at 
679.  In more recent work, Professor Wegner appears to have softened the radical 
interpretation of his claim, which is that we, as agents, are not really “controllers” whose 
mental processes cause action.  Daniel M. Wegner, Who Is the Controller of Controlled 
Processes?, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 19, 32 (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds., 2005) (“This theory 
is mute on whether thought does cause action.”).  On the other hand, Professor Wegner 
seems ambivalent and unwilling to give up the radical interpretation.  See id.at 27 (arguing 
that the “experience of conscious will is normally a construction” and referring to mental 
causation as “apparent”).  This apparent ambivalence is present in the work of others. 
274 See Morse, supra note 32, at 214–16 (discussing the meaning of compatibilism and its 
relation to criminal law). 
275 For example, we have no idea how the brain enables the mind.  PAUL R. MCHUGH & 
PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 11–12 (2d ed. 1998). 
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of ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices is a form of 
neuroarrogance.  Although I predict that we will see far more numerous 
attempts to use neuroscience in the future as evidence in criminal cases and 
to affect criminal justice policy, I have elsewhere argued that for conceptual 
and scientific reasons, there is no reason at present to believe that we are 
not agents.276  It is possible that we are not agents, but the current science 
does not remotely demonstrate that this is true.  The burden of persuasion is 
firmly on the proponents of the radical view. 
What is more, the radical view entails no positive agenda.  Suppose we 
were convinced by the mechanistic view that we are not intentional, rational 
agents after all.  (Of course, the notion of being “convinced” would be an 
illusion, too.  Being convinced means that we are persuaded by evidence or 
argument, but a mechanism is not persuaded by anything.  It is simply 
neurophysically transformed.)  What should we do now? We “know” 
(another mental state, but never mind) that it is an illusion to think that our 
deliberations and intentions have any causal efficacy in the world.  We also 
know, however, that we experience sensations such as pleasure and pain 
and that we care about what happens to us and to the world.  We cannot just 
sit quietly and wait for our brains to activate further, for determinism to 
happen.  We must and will deliberate and act. 
If we still thought that the radical view was correct and that standard 
notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert were therefore 
impossible, we might nevertheless continue to believe that the law would 
not necessarily have to give up the concept of incentives.  Indeed, Greene 
and Cohen concede that we would have to keep punishing people for 
practical purposes.277  Such an account would be consistent with “black 
box” accounts of economic incentives that simply depend on the relation 
between inputs and outputs without considering the mind as a mediator 
between the two.  For those who believe that a thoroughly naturalized 
account of human behavior entails complete consequentialism, such a 
conclusion might not be unwelcome.278 
 
276 See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two 
Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 19-34 (2008). 
277 Greene & Cohen, supra note 41, at 218.   
278 A clear implication of the disappearing person argument is that it would not be fair to 
punish dangerous people because no one deserves punishment (or anything else).  We might 
need to deprive dangerous people of their liberty to ensure social safety, but then we would 
be morally bound to compensate for the unfairness of restraining liberty by making the 
conditions of confinement (or other restraints) sufficiently positive.  In other words, a regime 
of “funishment” would be morally required.  Saul Smilansky, Hard Determinism and 
Punishment: A Practical Reductio, 30 LAW & PHIL. 353, 355 (2011).  I leave the perverse 
incentives this would create to the reader’s imagination, but defenders of the disappearing 
person view would be required to institute funishment and somehow to avoid the perverse 
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On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal 
contradiction just explored.  What is the nature of the “agent” that is 
discovering the laws governing how incentives shape behavior?  Could 
understanding and providing incentives via social norms and legal rules 
simply be epiphenomenal interpretations of what the brain has already 
done?  How do “we” “decide” which behaviors to reward or punish?  What 
role does “reason”—a property of thoughts and agents, not a property of 
brains—play in this “decision”? 
If the truth of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do, this 
premise yields no particular moral, legal, or political conclusions.  It will 
provide no guide as to how one should live or how one should respond to 
the truth of reductive mechanism.279  Normativity depends on reason and 
thus the radical view is normatively inert.  Neurons and neural networks do 
not have reasons.  Only people do.  If reasons do not matter, then we have 
no genuine, non-illusory reason to adopt any morals or politics, any legal 
rule, or to do anything at all.  Thus, this view does not entail 
consequentialism or a pure preventive scheme of social control. 
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly disappearing 
person remains fully visible and necessarily continues to act for good 
reasons, including the reasons currently to reject the radical view.  We are 
not Pinocchios and our brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings.  Mental 
disorder will continue to be a factor in all criminal justice decision making. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Mental disorder is a criterion for special treatment of offenders at 
every stage in the criminal process, from investigation to punishment.  The 
role it ought to play is context-dependent, however, and one must always 
ask what values and interests are being upheld by a special criminal mental 
health rule.  I have argued that society should try to maximize the liberty 
and dignity of people with mental disorders by treating them as much as is 
justifiably possible like people without disorders.  In particular, the use of 
preventive detention based on mental disorder should be strictly limited to 
extreme cases and the alleged non-responsibility of people with disorders 
should not be used to justify pure preventive detention in the large number 
of cases in which people with disorders are responsible.  We should not 
impermissibly fill the desert-disease gap with unjustified ascriptions of non-
 
incentives.  Smilansky’s argument is directed at hard determinists, but it is a fortiori directed 
at those who make the disappearing person claim, as long as the latter can make any moral 
claims at all.  See infra note 279 and accompanying text. 
279 I was first prompted to this line of thought by a suggestion Mitch Berman made in the 
context of a discussion of determinism and normativity.  Mitchell Berman, Punishment and 
Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 271 n.34 (2008). 
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responsibility.  I have also recommended a number of practical and 
procedural reforms that would make the system as fair as possible. 
